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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review
Introduction
On the 13th of February 2016, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia was found dead at a
luxury resort in Texas, leaving empty one of nine seats on the highest court in America. What
was for many a solemn moment soon emerged as a momentous and defining issue in the
presidential campaign underway, as his vacancy stirred an already raging political storm
surrounding the Supreme Court. Within hours Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell released
a statement announcing a brazen, and ultimately fruitful strategy to prevent President Obama
from filling the vacancy, writing, “The American People should have a voice in the selection of
their next Supreme Court Justice” (Everett & Thrush, 2016). The longest serving member of the
Court had been one of its most conservative members since his appointment by President Reagan
in 1986, and his death reverberated throughout the American body politic, prompting question
about the future of the Court’s ideological balance.
On the presidential campaign trail the issue of who would nominate Scalia’s replacement,
and the nominee’s characteristics, soon helped define the race for president. The very night of
Scalia’s death, the Republican primary debate began with a question to then-candidate Donald
Trump on the issue. His response, that Mitch McConnell and other Congressional leaders should
“delay, delay, delay” helped set the tone for the ensuing court battle over President Obama’s
nominee Merrick Garland, and foreshadowed Trump’s own nomination of Neil Gorsuch nearly a
year later to fill the Scalia vacancy (CBSN, 2016). In answering the debate question, Trump also
signaled who he might nominate to the bench, naming Diane Sikes and Bill Pryor as viable

4
choices. In an interview that day with CNN’s Sarah Murray, Trump noted that whoever he
nominated, “You really want that person to be as close to [Scalia] as possible” (CNN, 2016).
Trump was campaigning on the Court, as was everyone else.1
Despite the dramatic unfolding of events that helped elevate the Supreme Court during
the 2016 election—and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s recent and strikingly similar passing on
September 18th, 2020, less than 2 months before election day—the Supreme Court has often
found itself the center of election attention and controversy. This overt inclusion of the Court as
a campaign issue has not only been prompted by untimely deaths, but also comprises a nearly
half-century-long trend of dragging the Judiciary into campaigns for the Executive. Stretching
back to President Nixon’s harsh rhetoric aimed at the liberalism of Chief Justice Warren, many
presidents since the 1960’s—and during previous select elections2—have made the Supreme
Court a part of their campaign platform. Issues like constitutional protection for abortion,3 the
rights of the criminally accused,4 health care5 and gun rights,6 as well as specific justices like
Earl Warren, have all too often been the punchline on the stump and the rally cry of speeches.
This process of bringing the Court into campaign politics, and its foundation in the
general politicization of the Court, has broad implications not only for politics and elections, but
for the Court and the state of law in America as well. Presidents campaign on the Court because
Americans care about the issues it decides, and voters respond to this presidential rhetoric just as

1

During that same debate, one of Trump’s main rivals, Texas Senator Ted Cruz, said, “One of the most important
judgments for the men and women of South Carolina to make is who on this stage has the background, the principle,
the character, the judgment and the strength of resolve to nominate and confirm principled constitutionalists to the
court.” (As quoted in Hulse, 2019, 26).
2
1800,1832, 1860, 1896, 1912, 1924, and 1936 (Stephenson, 1999).
3
Roe v. Wade, 1973 (410 U.S. 113)
4
Mapp v. Ohio, 1961 (367 U.S. 643), Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963 (372 U.S. 375), Miranda v. Arizona, 1966 (384
U.S. 436)
5
NFIB v. Sebelius, 2012 (567 U.S. 519)
6
D.C. v. Heller, 2008 (554 U.S. 570)
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presidents tailor their messaging to the values of voters. These are, for better or worse, realities
of modern American politics. But what does the politicization of the Court, and the ridicule of its
justices do to the institution itself? Is the Supreme Court the impervious, counter-majoritarian
institution—concerned with preserving our principles and tempering our momentary whims—the
founders believed it would be? Or do stinging rebukes and soaring praise affect the justices as
they might the presidents who make them or the voters that hear them?
The question I seek to answer is how presidential campaign rhetoric influences the
rulings of the Supreme Court. Does messaging from a presidential nominee in support of an issue
increase the likelihood that the Court will vote in favor of the incoming or returning presidents’
position, or adopt their line of reasoning? Does the frequency and ideology of campaign rhetoric
influence how likely the Court is to be swayed? Ultimately, I seek to discover not only if
presidential campaign rhetoric influences the decisions of the Supreme Court, but also how the
nuances of that rhetoric manifest in Court outcomes.
Scholars have worked to describe the contours of outside influence on the Court
beginning with broad theories of judicial decision making that admit varying levels of constraint
upon the Court: the Legal Model most basically posits that only the law matters, while the
Attitudinal Model declares that justices are guided by their personal policy preferences (Segal &
Spaeth, 2002), and the Strategic Model counters that justices follow their policy preferences
within a system of constraints that moderate and shape their decisions (Epstein & Knight, 1998).
Despite legitimate differences in opinion and evidence for these models, nearly all scholars of
the Court agree that at least some factors beyond the word of the law creep into Supreme Court
decision making. Working within their preferred theories, these scholars have investigated how
the Court is and is not influenced. As I will describe, public opinion is a widely recognized
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(though contested) constraint upon the Court, as are Congress and the president. One Court
constraint that has yet to be investigated thoroughly though, is the effect of presidential
campaigns on the Court. This is my project.
By surveying the convention speeches, election debates, campaign advertising, and
official party platforms of winning presidential nominees for mentions of the Supreme Court and
its justices, and conducting two in-depth case studies, I hope to discover how presidential
campaign rhetoric influences the Supreme Court. How does the manner in which incoming or
returning presidents speak about the Court in their campaign affect how the Court behaves under
that administration? I first categorize the tenor or ideological push of campaign rhetoric and
messaging for each winning presidential candidate, searching the transcripts of convention
nomination acceptance speeches, election debates and campaign TV advertising, as well as the
text of the party platform. Through this I create a metric of presidential campaign Court-policy
signaling expressed as a sumIdeologicalPush variable for both civil liberties and non-civil
liberties issues. Second, I chart the partisanship of Court outcomes during the president’s
subsequent tenure, again dividing the data by civil liberties and non-civil liberties issues. Finally,
by comparing campaign signaling to Court outcomes for each presidential term, I hope to
discover what affect, if any, presidential campaign rhetoric has on the decisions of the Supreme
Court. If the Court can at times be constrained and swayed by the people, and by congress and
the president while in office—as the literature suggests—what are the effects of the drawn-out
and highly publicized campaigns that bring our president into the oval office?
In this paper I begin with a literature review describing constraints on Court decisionmaking and the value of presidential campaign rhetoric. From the founders’ intention to establish
an independent and insulated Judiciary, to public mood’s influence on the justices, I work to

7
categorize what outside forces can sway Court behavior and outcomes, and through what
mechanism. From here I describe the constraint of the president and Congress within the
separation of powers system, as well as the ability of rhetoric and campaigns to influence judicial
outcomes. The scholarship thus concludes that a host of factors can and do influence the
Supreme Court, and that presidential rhetoric can move—however slightly—both public opinion
and the Court. To end this first section, I detail my conceptualized mechanism of influence,
whereby presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric makes its way to the justices. Following
my Chapter 1 literature review, in Chapter 2 I conduct a case study of campaign rhetoric during
President Nixon’s first campaign, in 1968, and President Clinton’s second, in 1996. Chapter 3
presents my methods and quantitative data: verbal analysis of nomination acceptance speeches,
election debates, party platform, and campaign ads, as well as subsequent votes on the Court.
Finally, in Chapter 4 I present my results and conclusions.

Literature Review
In my literature review I describe the founders’ intentional design of a constrained
Supreme Court, and the unintended factors that can at times shape the Court’s decisions.
Beginning with the broadest constraint, I detail public opinion’s impact on the Court. Next, and
more narrowly, I survey scholarship describing the separation of powers constraint on the Court,
that is, both indirect and direct congressional and presidential pressures and limits. Finally, and
most related to the project at hand, I review presidential rhetoric’s effect upon the Court as well
as the influence of campaigns. By describing the contours of Court constraints, I demonstrate
both that the Supreme Court can at times be shaped by varying formal and informal systems and
checks, and crucially, that one of those factors can be presidential rhetoric. From here I theorize
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that the influence of presidential rhetoric on the Supreme Court can extend to the campaign, and
that presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric influences the Supreme Court through a
mechanism whereby justices and soon-to-be justices are exposed to this Court-centered rhetoric.

Constraints Upon the Court
The Supreme Court was given remarkably little design or direction at the founding, and
though its modern form would be nearly unrecognizable to the framers, one thing was clear at
the founding: The Court was to be independent, insulated, and weak. In its brief three Sections in
Article III of the Constitution, the “Supreme Court” is mentioned only once, as are “Judges,”
while the term “Court” appears only another four times (U.S. Const. art. III § 1-3). Nowhere are
the number of justices listed—as a long history of varied Court sizes reiterates—and the title of
Chief Justice appears only elsewhere in the Constitution, in Article 1, Section III when detailing
the procedure for Presidential Impeachment (U.S. Const. art. I § 3).
The Court was not without signposts to guide it though, as records from the
Constitution’s debate and framing continue to remind us of its limited power and purpose even
today. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 78—a widely cited and deeply influential record
on the matter—that "the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to
annoy or injure them.” Hamilton continued with the oft cited phrase that the Supreme Court “has
no influence over either the sword or the purse” (Hamilton, 1788, 464). The founders were wary
of overbearing judicial authority. The proposition of a lower federal court system in addition to
the Supreme Court failed to gain the requisite support to be ratified at the Constitutional
Convention. As a South Carolinian delegate predicted, “the states will revolt at such
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encroachments” (As cited in Epstein & Walker, 2017, 57). In this way, the Supreme Court was
established, at least in theory, to “have neither force nor will” beyond its ambiguous
Constitutional authority over “all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and Treaties” (U.S. Const. art. 3).
More than simply limiting the Court’s power and authority, many of the founders payed
special attention to the independence of the Judiciary. They saw it as a grave threat to democracy
for the Court to be influenced by a coordinate branch of government, or by the masses.7 Having
only recently declared independence from a constitutional monarchy, the founders were
understandably wary of unitary power, and devout in their dedication to governing principles —
liberty and justice chief among them. Hamilton noted the evil that could result from insufficient
separation of powers, warning that the “general liberty of the people” was safe from improper
Court rulings in so long as “the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the
executive” (464).8 Fears over influence from the popular will persuaded the founders as well,
shaping the Court’s tenure policy, and its divided nomination and confirmation process between
the president and the Senate. Looking back, Justice Jackson praised the value of insulating
principles of law from public opinion, noting that “the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy…to place them beyond
the reach of majorities” (quoted in Flemming & Wood, 1997, 469). Importantly, the
fundamentally undemocratic, counter majoritarian nature of Constitutional law, and the Supreme
Court’s role as arbiter, remain at the center of questions about Court legitimacy even now.
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“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution” (Hamilton,
1788, 465).
8
In full, Hamilton writes, “It equally proves that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the
courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the
judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive” (Hamilton, 1788, 464).
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Since the framing, the Court and the principles upon which it was founded have
wandered with time, leaving us today with a nine justice Court that is far more powerful than its
predecessors. With power comes responsibility, so the phrase goes, and with its increased
authority rightfully comes increased scrutiny of the Court’s independence. How did we arrive
here?
First and foremost, Marbury v. Madison (1803) codified judicial review, subjecting all
law to the specter of the judicial axe. Since then, the Court has woven in and out of judicial eras
termed for their chief justices and defining cases and concepts: from the Taney Court’s fallacious
ruling upholding states’ right to preserve and enforce slavery in Scott v. Sandford (1857); to the
Chase Court’s affirmations of Reconstruction; to the Lochner era grant of free rein to enterprise,
to devastating effect; through fierce opposition from the Court, and then willingness, in regard to
FDR’s New Deal; to the Warren era protection of yet unrecognized fundamental rights, chief
among them the right to privacy that Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) would provide, and its
product, Roe v. Wade (1973). Throughout this history the Court has leaned right and left and
taken on new responsibilities while shirking others. One constant thread though has been the
Court’s overall increase in authority and power as it has—for good and bad—pushed beyond the
limitations and ambiguous confines of the founding era.
Insulating the Court from the public was also a prized goal at the time of the framing.
Justice Felix Frankfurter took a cynical position on the matter, claiming that "to a large extent the
Supreme Court, under the guise of constitutional interpretation of words whose contents are
derived from the disposition of the Justices, is the reflector of that impalpable but controlling
thing, the general drift of public opinion" (Quoted in McGuire & Stimson, 1937, 197, italics
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added). So, is the Court no longer insulted, reliant instead on changing mores and fluctuating
ideals?
Modern judicial politics scholarship universally recognizes the evident transformation of
the Supreme Court since its founding, though takes multiple views on the question of the
strength of the Court’s insulation from outside influence. Some, such as Segal and Spaeth
(2002), note the Court’s willingness to make unpopular decisions as evidence of its strength, as
when the Court ruled to stop a presidential election recount in Bush v. Gore (2000). They point
to this kind of defection from what a reserved and dependent Court might do to posit that the
Judiciary remains largely isolated and unaffected by outside factors. Others, such as Adamany
and Grossman (1983), point to the Judiciary’s inherent reliance on coordinate branches of
government to qualify its dependence. Ultimately, the overwhelming body of scholarship
(detailed below), as well as the potential for both defiance of Court rulings from government
(Canon & Johnson, 1999) and ineffective implementation when the public opposes a decision
(Rosenberg, 1991), paints a picture of a moderately dependent Court that is at risk of outside
influence. Though questions about what kind, by whom, and how much influence remain.
Justice Scalia noted the same reality of outside influence on the Court with his
unescapable bluntness: “it’s a little unrealistic to talk about the Court as though it’s a continuous,
unchanging institution rather than to some extent necessarily a reflection of the society in which
it functions” (Quoted in McGuire & Stimson, 2004, 1020).
Judicial politics inherently recognizes this reality of pressures and influence and is thus
built upon models of decision making that, to varying degrees, accept outside sway (to the likely
dismay of the founders). The Strategic Model is the most accepting of the constraining effect of
outside influence, fundamentally positing that justices act to achieve their preferred policy
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preferences within a system in which constraints limit the pursuit of those goals (Epstein &
Knight, 1998). The Attitudinal Model retains only the idea that justices work toward their
preferred outcomes, and in this way denies many constraints while continuing to recognize the
role of the individual justice in the decision-making process (Segal & Spaeth, 2002). The Legal
Model ignores external influence altogether, hypothesizing that only the law matters, and that
this is all that dictates decisions (Baum, 1997). In this project I work under the assumption that
the strategic model most accurately describes the contours of judicial decision making, as the
conception which best accounts for the complexities of judging within a liberal democracy with
(and sometimes against) co-equal embers of government.
Despite all these models and scholarly predictions, the Supreme Court retains an element
of surprise. There is a reason we remember the names of the justices: they each hold immense
influence over the opinions of the Court and thus the legal realities of our country. Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes shamelessly commented that "We are under the Constitution, but
the Constitution is what the judges say it is" (Quoted in Segal & Spaeth, 2002, 3). This quote
illustrates the tenuous nature of our Constitutional system and implies the significance of the job
the justices do. It also hints at the tremendous effect outside influence can have upon the law by
swaying even a single justice. Ultimately, though there exist multiple understandings of how
constraints operate on the Supreme Court, the notion of a constrained Court at all is not by
design, though without a doubt it is a reality.
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Public Opinion and the Court

“The Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”
—Justice Felix Frankfurter, writing in Baker v. Carr (1962)

The Supreme Court, in all its splendor and majesty, and despite the founders’ best efforts
to insulate it, is influenced by “sustained public confidence.” The scholarship affirms this basic
intuition. In their pioneering study, Mishler and Sheehan (1993) demonstrate the reciprocal
relationship between public opinion and the broad ideological tenor of the Supreme Court,
stating that “for most of the period since 1956, the Court has been highly responsive to majority
opinion" (97). Relatedly, Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) note what they term a dynamic
representation, whereby a 1-point shift in the ideology of public opinion is associated with a 0.3point shift in ideology on the Court. To add nuance, Link (1995) finds that the influence of
public opinion varies by issue area. Expanding upon this body of work, McGuire and Stimson
(2004) make a grander assertion that by looking only at reversals of lower court rulings “the
impact of public mood is far greater than previously documented” (1019). To this growing
consensus, Epstein and Martin (2010) note that public mood remains a statistically significant
factor even after taking into account ideology. Ultimately, the scholarship supports the idea that
the justices of the Supreme Court react to the public will, but rather than shift at every
momentary whim of changing public opinion, they “gauge the prevailing winds” (McGuire &
Stimson, 2004, 1019).
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Beyond a sturdy consensus regarding public opinion’s influence on the Court, there
remain important questions surrounding how exactly public mood influences the high court when
there exists no direct apparatus for public input or control over the Judiciary. Public mood
evidently does seep into the decisions of the Court, but by what mechanism?

“The Judges of any court…work in an insulted atmosphere in their courthouses…But these same
judges go home at night and read the newspapers or watch…television; they talk to their family
and friends about current events. Somewhere ‘out there’—beyond the walls of the courthouse—
run currents and tides of public opinion which lap at the courthouse door.”
—Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 1986 (Rehnquist)

Despite the Supreme Court’s theoretical insulation and independence, and its countermajoritarian design, it evidently acts as a political institution, at least in part, bending toward the
will of the people. One of the first scholars to research public opinion’s effect on the Supreme
Court, Robert Dahl (1957), wrote that “the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans
are not quite willing to accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of
denying it” (279). Subsequent research has reinforced this notion by claiming that the Court is a
part of the dominant political structure—rather than a limit on it. Caldiera (1986) demonstrates
this point, showing that a 10% increase in support for the president correlates to a 1% increase in
support for the Court. The Court is also a durable institution, and one able to weather momentary
downturns in public approval, like that seen following the contentious decision in Bush v. Gore
(2000) (Yates & Whitford, 2002). This research shows that public esteem for the Court is
influenced by the frequency of judicial activism and major political events (such as Watergate),
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as well as crime and economic conditions. While the Court can be shaped by public opinion, it
does remain generally well-liked and resilient. Regardless, as Dahl (1957) wrote bluntly, “the
Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance” (293).
Perhaps the most important debate still unresolved within the realm of the Supreme Court
and public opinion is whether public opinion’s observed influence on the Court is the result of
indirect or direct influence. In this context, indirect influence comes about through the natural
channels of democratic politics; people’s opinions change, they vote in new representatives to
government who either appoint and confirm new justices that better reflect public opinion or
constrain the existing Court. Direct influence happens when the public mood changes and the
Court and its justices react and adapt without new justices joining the bench or Congressional or
Executive threats against the Judiciary. In the language of the justices themselves, does the Court
move because the efficacy of their decisions “rests on sustained public confidence” as
Frankfurter wrote, or because, as Rehnquist observed, “judges go home at night?”
The Supreme Court’s only explicit restraints (beyond the word of the law) come from the
process by which justices are appointed and can be removed from office. Only once in Court
history has a justice been impeached (and in 1805 Samuel Chase was acquitted by the Senate).
The appointment process on the other hand gives the president the power to nominate justices
(Article II, Section 2), and the Senate the authority to confirm them (Article 1, Section 5), and
thus provides for a certain level of indirect influence of the public will upon the Court.
Presidents and Senators alike conceivably nominate and confirm justices consistent with the
views of their constituents. Also known as The Replacement Theory, this notion of the Court’s
reactive nature posits that change is facilitated by replacing justices on the bench and has been
the dominant conception since Dahl’s 1957 research on the influence of public opinion (Funston,
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1975; Norpoth & Segal, 1994). Bolstering this conception of the interaction between the public
and the Court as facilitated by an indirect influence mechanism, Stimson et al (1995) argue that
though there is some observable effect of public opinion on the Court, nearly all of it can be
explained by Court composition.
More intriguing—and far more significant to my research question—is the study of the
direct influence of public mood on the Court, absent or beyond changes to the occupants of the
bench. This model, also known as The Political Adjustment Theory, posits that the Supreme
Court and its members react to broad changes in public opinion because they can gage trends in
American thought, and may themselves even partake in such evolution. Thus, evolution on the
Court occurs not just because newly appointed justices bring fresh, popular ideas, but because
justices care what Americans think, and are themselves members of the changing popular will.
Mishler and Sheehan (1993) brought the idea to the fore, arguing that it is complimentary to the
notion of the public’s direct influence on the Court. Flemming and Wood (1997) and McGuire
and Stimson (2004) argue more enthusiastically that public opinion directly affects the Court, its
justices, and their decisions, while Link (1995) shows evidence of direct effects in the areas of
criminal procedure and civil rights. Relatedly, Giles et al. (2008) argue that the mechanism for
change on the court is fundamentally attitudinal, not strategic, and that changes in justices’
behavior result from personal policy preference reconsiderations, not concerns for public
approval. This is a vibrant and worthy debate, and hints at the conclusion that in fact public
opinion has both indirect and direct effects on the Supreme Court as a whole, as well as on its
justices and decisions (Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson, 1995).
Another important question asks whether the Court or the justices change and adapt to the
public? Most studies concern the behavior of the Court; after all, it is the Court that issues the
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rulings that bind us all in law. Others though, such as Mishler and Sheehan (1996), argue that a
“significant minority” of justices are influenced by public opinion, noting that the effects of
popular mood are more pronounced with moderate justices. In their study, “significant effects”
were observed in just under half of justices, while “substantial effects” were found in 1/3 of
justices. Flemming and Wood (1997) go further, declaring that no issue or justice is immune to
the effects of public opinion on the Court, and that a 29% shift in public opinion liberalism
corresponded to a 2% shift in justice liberalism. Pushing back slightly, Giles et al. (2008) asserts
that public opinion operates on only 20% of justices. Taken together, this body of research shows
that not only is the Court influenced by public opinion, but (and this follows quite obviously) the
individual justices who make up the Court are affected by public mood as well. Synthesizing this
scholarship, it is clear that the Court and its justices are influenced by public opinion, but to
varying degrees.
Lastly, justices adapt more or less to the public will depending on issue area. Link (1995)
finds that public mood influences criminal procedure and race related civil rights cases. Public
opinion has also been found to affect the justices in First Amendment cases, as well as Civil
Rights, Judicial Power and Tax issues, while Union, Economic, and Criminal Procedure do not
see the effect of public opinion as strongly (Flemming & Wood, 1997). Inspired by this research,
I consider civil liberties and non-civil liberties issues separately in my data.
The Supreme Court’s pristine image as an insulated, independent body does not stand the
test of time nor the prying eye of the public record; public opinion influences the decisions
justices make and the rulings the Court hands down. It does not affect all justices equally—
median justices are more susceptible to influence—, nor all issue areas the same—civil rights
cases can be more easily swayed by public opinion than cases concerning economic issues—, but
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it affects all on the Court, even if just a little bit. As it turns out, both worries over “sustained
public confidence,” as well as the insidious effects of “going home,” can nudge the Supreme
Court toward the will of the people.

Separations of Powers: Congressional and Presidential Constraints on the Supreme Court
While the founders made a concerted effort to protect against public influence on the
Supreme Court, they did grant Congress and the President select oversight over the Judiciary as
part of the checks and balances inherent to the separation of powers system. These constraints
rather rightly reciprocate the Court’s own ability to check congressional laws and presidential
action—though Marbury v. Madison (1803) came after the founding and was thus less a part of
our nation’s design than a result of it. Beyond the already-addressed power to confirm and
remove justices, Congress can revoke appellate jurisdiction, change the construction and makeup
of the federal judiciary, alter the size of the Supreme Court, and has control over the judicial
budget. More substantially, Congress can pass laws or propose Constitutional Amendments to
overrule statutory or constitutional Court decisions. In addition, Congress can just plain refuse to
implement or fund the mandates of Court rulings (Rosenberg, 1992, 337; Harvey & Friedman,
2006).
The president’s authority and ability to constrain the Court is most similar to this last
potential congressional limit. Beyond the power to appoint new justices, and the authority that
accompanies being the leader of a political party, the president may only limit or punish the
Judiciary through refusing to implement Court rulings. Additionally, though, the President
appoints a Solicitor General, and as the government’s top lawyer this individual and their office
wield extraordinary power before the Court. Known by some as the 10th justice, the Office of the
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Solicitor General is one of the most widely recognized and thoroughly impactful tools of
presidential influence, as their attorneys regularly outperform other advocates both as amici9
authors and when arguing before the Court (Kearney & Merrill, 2000; Black & Owens, 2013).
While scholars do not dispute the reality of these mechanisms, there is fierce debate over
what role, if any, they play in constraining the Court and shaping its decisions. The Strategic
Model posits that justices will act strategically in pursuit of their policy preferences and
moderate their votes not only to accommodate the will of the people—as we have seen—but also
to account for the position and strength of Congress and the president.
Importantly, there are those who disagree, taking issue with the entire Strategic Model as
well as with the specifics of the separation of powers constraint. In particular, Sala and Spriggs
(2004) reject the separation of powers model, claiming that they can only find empirical
evidence for the attitudinal model. They do, though, allow for the prospect of inter-justice
strategic behavior10—a tricky solution. Spriggs and Hansford (2001) also claim to find no
separation of powers constraint, but as their paper describes only instances of addressing and
overturning precedent, this conclusion should not be stretched too far.
Most scholars, though, agree that the separation of powers system—the balance struck
between the Courts, Congress, and the president—does conditionally constrain the Court (Clark,
2009; Clark & McGuire, 1996; Harvey & Friedman, 2006; Rogers et al. 2006). Most broadly and
enthusiastically, Harvey and Friedman (1996) find that the justices, and even the lawyers arguing
before them, act strategically when constrained by the separation of powers system. This
happens not just when justices write opinions but throughout the process, from lawyers deciding

9

A “friend of the Court” brief submitted to add further perspective and often yet-unexplored arguments to cases
already before the Court.
10
Strategic behavior between the justices has been observed at the certiorari stage, during agenda setting, and when
voting and writing opinions (Epstein & Knight, 1998).
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what cases to argue, to the justices granting certiorari. The authors even conclude that “scholars
may be significantly underestimating the effect of institutional constrains on the Court”
(555). More precisely, Epstein, Knight and Martin (2001) find that moderate justices adjust votes
in regard to the position of the president and median senators in constitutional civil rights cases,
and Bergara et al. (2003) agree.
More precisely, Clark (2009) found a measurable reduction in judicial review from the
Court when it was threatened with proposed court curbing laws11. Looking to instances where
there was intense congressional hostility, Rosenberg (1992) similarly found that only under very
specific circumstances was the Court not heavily constrained by Congress.
An enduring question in the research asks how congressional constraint differs in
statutory cases as compared to constitutional cases. Conventional knowledge expects the
congressional constraint to be greater in statutory cases, as it takes the passing of a mere statute
(simple majority) to ostensibly overturn unfavorable rulings. The Court is aware of this and thus
may be more likely to anticipate and react strategically to this threat by not ruling unfavorably.
In constitutional cases, a constitutional amendment is required (supermajority, 2/3) to overturn
the ruling, and this daunting task leads many to predict less constraint for the Court. Not all
scholars agree. Epstein, Knight and Martin (2001) argue that the Court might even be more
likely to be constrained in constitutional cases than statutory cases because they are more high
profile, while Harvey and Friedman (2006) more basically find "considerable congressional
constraint in the Court's constitutional rulings" (533). Martin (2005) splits the difference, writing
that the Supreme Court responds attitudinally in statutory cases and strategically in constitutional
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Laws that threaten to undermine a Court ruling or the Court itself. For example, the Flag Protection Amendment
of 1990 was proposed in response to the Texas v. Johnson (1989) decision which upheld the right to burn the
American flag on 1st Amendment grounds (Clark & McGuire, 1996).
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cases. This is all to say, the influence of the separation of powers constraint on the Court is
disputed, but without a doubt the constraint exists.
As a check within the separation of powers system, the president acts as a unique, and
uniquely powerful, constraint on the Court. Martin (2005) concludes that “the president is the
primary constraint on the justices” (19), while Link (1995) relatedly finds that "the Court
responds more rapidly to changes in the position of the executive than to shifts in congressional
or public sentiment" (75). More germane to this study still, Rosenberg (1992) found that, in
presidential and congressional elections that have a Court component, a loss for the anti-Court
side yields a more independent judiciary—and conversely, when elections land Court opponents
in office the Court is least independent. Mimicking this result, Yates and Whitford (1998) write
that “justices’ decision to support the president are conditioned upon presidents’ public approval
ratings and the justices’ ideological inclinations” (539). This association with presidential
approval affects the weight of public opinion on the Court as well, as Schorpp (2012)
demonstrates that the public is a particularly effective constraint upon the Court when the public
aligns with the executive. Further away, yet relevant still, the field of comparative courts offers a
lesson from Argentina where, as the president became less powerful, the Court defected more
often (Helmke 2002, 2003). High presidential approval reinforces presidential constraint on the
Court. Fascinatingly, not only might the president be the strongest constraint upon the Court in
the separation of powers system, but also the most interconnected with the other great constraint:
public opinion. As Schorpp (2012) writes “the relationship between public opinion, the
Executive, and the courts can be seen as a triangle in which the public has the power to tip the
scales in favor of either of the two branches” (280). This all carries deeply interesting
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implications for the power and weight of presidential influence on the Court during the most
highly visible time for an emerging president: the campaign.

The Power of Presidential Rhetoric
Presidents influence the Supreme Court in other ways beyond through institutional
instruments, using rhetoric both indirectly and directly to influence the Court itself. History and
scholarly research beg the question, if presidents can affect the public and the Court through
mere—though often unforgettable—words, can incoming or returning presidents influence the
Court when speaking on the campaign trail as well? Or does the power of the bully-pulpit only
count after the election, when the presidential seal marks the lectern?
Throughout American history presidents have at times spoken both tactfully and forcibly
about the Court and its decisions. Notably, in 2012 President Obama made a not so veiled
warning to the Court to uphold the Affordable Care Act before it heard NFIB v. Sebelius (2012),
advising that he was “confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an
unprecedented, extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a
democratically elected Congress” (Peters and Woolley, “Address Before the Joint Session of the
Congress on the State of the Union,” 2012). Whether questioning the Court’s legitimacy or
threatening it, President Obama was speaking publicly to the Court. Far bolder still, in 1832
President Jackson openly rejected the Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), vetoing a
bill to recharter the Second Bank of the United States expressly allowed by the Court’s 1819
ruling. He famous declared that “The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself
be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution” (Jackson, 1832; Cited in Blackstone &
Goelzhauser, 2014, 180). Though this rhetoric of defiance came after the Court decision was

23
handed down, the threat it signaled going forward was unmistakable. Additionally, the
opportunity for these kinds of threats have only increased with time, as presidents have
increasingly used public rhetoric as a mode of political influence throughout the 20th century
(Lim, 2002).
Perhaps the most widely recognized instance of a president’s rhetorical attack on the
Court occurred when, in the 1930’s, Franklin Roosevelt launched a policy-oriented campaign to
alter the Court’s membership and size following a string of anti-New Deal decisions. Though the
“court packing” plan failed, Roosevelt’s pressure campaign prevailed in what would come to be
known as the “switch in time that saved nine,” whereby Justice Owen Roberts helped end the
Lochner Era of conservative rulings on economic matters, becoming a consistent fifth vote in
support of Roosevelt’s liberal New Deal. Though not an instance of campaign rhetoric, this is a
stark illustration of the influence presidential words and proposals can have on the Court.
More fundamentally, presidential rhetoric can affect public opinion. As previously
discussed, this may hold an indirect key to the hearts and minds of the justices. This is a slow
and disconnected process though, but one worthy of recognition, nonetheless. Presidential
rhetoric is heavily studied and widely recognized to being an influential tool of the office. As
one of the preeminent scholars of presidential rhetoric, Jeffrey Tulis (2017), observed, rhetoric
“is not one duty among many, but rather the heart of the presidency – its essential task” (4). At
its best, presidential rhetoric can be characterized as the ability to “define social reality”
(Zarefsky, 2004, 607). When used strategically, presidents can create associations between ideas,
dissociate previously linked concepts, add issues to already recognized groupings, suggesting
and creating frames through which to understand questions. Zarefsky (2004) explains how, in the
1980s for example, President Reagan disassociated rare examples of welfare fraud from the vast
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body of “truly needy” Americans, ultimately redefining welfare for a generation and harmfully
defunding and deconstructing the American social safety net (617). By using these various
rhetorical tools effectively, presidents can manipulate public sentiment to impressive ends, but
the particulars of this causal loop are curious. For example, presidents need not be that
convincing to be effective. By merely giving more attention to economic issues, foreign policy,
and civil rights policy in the yearly State of the Union address, presidents can increase the
number of Americans who pay attention to those issues (Cohen, 1995). Relatedly, presidents can
use rhetoric to effectively influence their own approval by “priming the criteria on which citizens
base their approval evaluations,” that is, by shaping what issues their performance and popularity
are ostensibly graded upon (Druckman & Holmes, 2004). What increases public attention is not
so much the arguments that the president makes, but the very fact that the president makes an
argument at all. In this way, presidential rhetoric is a principal tool for influencing public
opinion, and a potential key to influencing the Court.
Beyond presidential rhetoric’s ability to raise the profile of national issues and
presidential approval, the language the president uses can shape support specifically for the
Court, as well as for the issues before it. In this way presidents can be a “source cue,” whereby
people interpret the presidents’ rhetoric through their relationship to, and opinion of them
(Montgomery et al., 2019). If presidents speak negatively about the Court, their supporters will
look less favorably upon the institution, while conversely, their critics become more likely to
support the Court.
By being a source cue, presidents can affect support for the Court, but they aren’t the
only ones. Armaly (2018) finds “that individual politicians—particularly those who may have a
bully pulpit—are capable of influencing attitudes toward the Court” (610). This opens the door
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for not just elected presidents, but successful presidential candidates out on the campaign trail, to
use their national media coverage to influence public attitudes toward the Court.
Presidential rhetoric is also polarizing, as the president does not have the power to
influence diffuse support of the Court (Gibson, Caldeira & Spence, 2003). This means that
though presidents can influence the opinions of their supporters and non-supporters toward the
Court, they struggle to increase or decrease aggregate approval or disapproval for the Court in
any measurable way. This squares nicely with Gibson and Caldeira’s (2005) finding that the
Supreme Court’s institutional legitimacy generally remains strong despite momentary shifts in
opinion within the population.
Importantly, the likelihood presidents speak about the Court (in a positive or negative
light) varies as a product of their own capital and objectives. Specifically, factors such as
elections, Court vacancies, and war, as well as a president’s own background as a lawyer, can
influence the Commander in Chief’s propensity to speak out for or against the Court, and can
shape the tone of the messaging (Blackstone & Goelzhauser, 2014). Furthermore, the amount of
presidential rhetoric directed at the Court is influenced by factors such as policy goals, the desire
to bolster re-election attempts, and historical legacies (Eshbaugh-Soha & Collins, 2015). Seen
together, the research suggests that presidential rhetoric can shape public opinion of the Court by
raising the public stature of issues before it, and affecting the opinions of supporters. Therefore,
presidential rhetoric can indirectly influence the Court through the vehicle of public opinion.
One area where presidential rhetoric regarding the Court is particularly effective is when
presidents “goes public” in support of Court nominees. By speaking to the American people
rather than dealing in closed-door meetings with congressional leaders, presidents are able to
have “a marked influence” on the “ability to win confirmation” (663). As Johnson and Roberts
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(2004) further write, “there is a definitive relationship between a president’s strategy to go public
and the fate of that nominee” (679). The words of the president can not only move public opinion
and indirectly sway the Court but influence Congress as well. Importantly, presidents may at
times engage in a “public expenditure of capital” to support a nominee they approve of, even—
and in fact more often—when facing off against an ideologically unsympathetic Congress. This
strategic maneuver to speak over the heads of Congress to the American people when facing
opposition from Congressional leaders hints toward presidents’ strategic use of rhetoric when
facing down political obstacles, as well as the power of those public words to change minds and
move political tides.
More to the point, research suggests that presidents can and do influence the Supreme
Court directly through the use of rhetoric; this finding is vital to explaining my project’s
proposed mechanism of influence. Importantly, this is a public process, as generally presidents
are ineffective at privately influencing the Court (Edwards & Wayne, 1985, as cited in Yates,
2002). In his 2002 book Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the
Supreme Court, Jeff Yates details the power of “presidential policy signaling.” By coding the
number of lines that discuss different policy concerns in State of the Union addresses to indicate
Presidential policy signaling, Yates determines that "presidential rhetoric and presidential
prestige, do exert a statistically significant influence on justice voting" (79, 95). He determines
that indeed "presidents can contemporaneously affect the voting decisions of Supreme Court
justices by sending public signals of their policy preferences" (102). Ultimately, the mechanism
of presidential influence of Supreme Court outcomes is a conglomeration of the ability to shape
public opinion and the threat of the power of enforcement. Importantly though, this demonstrates
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that there remains a direct avenue of influence between the words of the president and the
decisions of the Court.
This peculiar fact in many ways grounds my project; if the Supreme Court can be
influenced not only indirectly and directly by changing tides in public mood, and constrained by
the separation of powers, but can also be moved directly through the words and policy signals of
the president when is office, it is vital to understand how strong this power to influence is, and
when it begins.

Mechanism of Influence
I theorize that through various mechanisms of influence, such as news coverage,
relationships with clerks, and beholding nomination statements, it is reasonable to expect sitting
justices—and even soon-to-be nominated justices—to be exposed to Court-centered presidential
campaign rhetoric.
Most available research on the effect of presidential rhetoric on the Court has
understandably focused on the tenure of the president, but newly elected presidents—and to a
greater extent, re-elected presidents—do not enter office unknown. Voters begin to form lasting
opinions of the incoming Commander in Chief over many months of tireless campaigning as the
candidates crisscross the nation. In our modern era, the separation between the rhetoric of
electoral politics and governing politics has been challenged, as Tulis (2017) observes, the
“distinction between governing and campaigning has been effaced” (183). Olson et al. (2012)
endorse this understanding as well, writing that President Obama’s “campaign and governing
rhetoric are consistent,” and that regarding the different bodies of rhetoric the authors find “no
statistical difference in the level of scrutiny or inclusiveness” (1403). This research adds nuance
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to the common conception that campaign rhetoric is entirely separate from the language of the
presidency, though despite it, presidential campaigns do remain at least in part distinct from time
in the Oval Office. Jerit (2004) notes that campaign rhetoric is effective, but importantly, that
“emotional appeals” achieve the most impact and longevity. Looking specifically at campaign
rhetoric surrounding budgets, Burden and Sanberg (2003) describe how “budget rhetoric varies
across candidacies in systematic and explainable ways,” and that the “budget’s balance itself and
the importance given it by voters” directly affect how much the candidate speaks about the issue
(114). This research points toward two conclusions: that campaign rhetoric is at least in part
distinct, as well as impactful, and that the specifics of that rhetoric dictate its effectiveness,
though are themselves influenced by the political environment.
But, when a presidential hopeful speaks on the campaign trail, who hears their words, and
who understands their warnings? Do the justices? What are the effects of this campaign rhetoric
on the Judiciary? How does this unique period of mass public exposure—and the earliest
signaling of presidential priorities—influence the Court?
Though the Court is uniquely secretive,12 anecdotes as well as open declarations indicate
that the nine justices are anything but removed from the political news of the day, relying on
both their clerks as well as their own curiosity to stay informed. In a famous, if crass, story from
Woodward and Armstrong’s 1979 book The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court, then-associate
justice William Rehnquist brought a copy of the magazine National Lampoon into the Court to
show his colleagues a cartoon titled “Amicae Curiae” (friend of the Court), depicting the nine
“engaged in a variety of sexual activity” (279). This example, though laughable, hints at an
important conclusion: Supreme Court justices remain remarkably well informed when it comes
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The Court continues to refuse cameras in the courtroom and decides cases in closed-door conferences where not
even clerks are allowed.
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to the news of the day, particularly if it involves them. Their clerks play an important role in this
as well. One can only assume that Justice Rehnquist did not subscribe to Hustler Magazine, but
rather that he was shown the magazine centerfold by a friend or a clerk. Either way, it follows
that when the Court is mentioned in public, the justices likely hear about it.
The justices are not only aware of potentially defamatory news concerning their own
image, but also tend to be enthusiastic readers of journalism in general. In a 2009 interview with
C-SPAN, Justice Kennedy remarked that not only did he read the work of the Supreme Court
press, but regarding Law Journals he and his fellow justices “look at that with some care" (CSPAN, “Kennedy,” 2009). In her autobiography, Justice O’Connor (2013) recounted how in
2005 a law professor wrote a paper on how often the justices elicited laughs from the audience
during oral argument, noting how The New York Times had covered the project. One of her
biographers, Evan Thomas (2019) later noted rather more plainly that the first female justice
made a habit of “read[ing] the papers and followed the news” (99).
For his part, Justice Scalia responded slyly to an interview question about whether he
read opinion pieces criticizing his work on the Court by saying, “To understand all is to forgive
all” (C-SPAN, “Scalia,” 2012). In the same interview he went on to recount how often he had
been pushed to write to The Washington Post regarding their “criticism” of the Court, only to rip
up his Letters to the Editor out of deference to Court neutrality. Not all justices hold back
though. Justice O’Connor recounted in her book how Justice Douglas had read a story in The
Washington Post supporting the building of a road where one of his favoring towpaths ran.
Douglas challenged the paper’s editors to walk the nearly 200-mile stretch, and eventually
helped to designate the land as a national historical park (139-140). Both Scalia’s torn-up
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responses to the Post’s “criticism,” and Douglas’ challenge to the paper’s editors suggest that the
justices read The Washington Post in the first place.
The justices also follow politics and elections with a keen interest. Notoriously, at a 2000
election watch-party Justice O’Connor exclaimed “This is terrible!” when CBS called Florida for
Al Gore.13 More recently, Justice Ginsburg gave an interview as the 2020 election season was
gearing up in which she noted that "I have heard that there are some people on the Democratic
side who would like to increase the number of judges” (Totenberg, 2019). Though she
disavowed the idea, saying that "Nine seems to be a good number,” election rhetoric surrounding
the Court had reached the ears of at least one justice. Since the election, Justice Breyer has been
exposed to and commented on the same idea, noting in a lecture at Harvard in April 2021 that
"Proposals have been recently made to increase the number of Supreme Court justices” (Harvard
Law School, 2021). Maltzman et al. add additional evidence to the notion that justices are aware
and engaged in political news and elections in their 2004 article titled Supreme Court Justices
Really Do Follow the Election Returns. Citing a tally sheet that Chief Justice Rehnquist
circulated among the justices in 1992, the authors show that the high court is not only aware of
presidential races (as we might expect of government officials), but deeply engaged in the
specifics of national elections—even betting on them. They demonstrate that though the justices
are lawyers and not politicians, many of their political instincts are accurate, collectively
predicting 85% of state outcomes in the 1992 presidential race (840). O’Connor, who, as
previously noted, was keenly aware and invested in news and elections, proved the most
accurate, while Thomas14—well recognized as politically disinterested, if oblivious—came in
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This became controversial as O’Connor would go on to cast what may well have been the deciding vote in Bush v.
Gore (2000) mere months later, handing the presidency to George W. Bush.
14
Even justices like Thomas who show little interest in politics have important links and information cues to current
news and events. Thomas’ wife, Ginni Thomas, is a notorious political actor in multiple far Right movements, and
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last (840). As we might assume and hope, Supreme Court justices care not just about the news,
but about the contests that elect their fellow members of government.
Another link between the justices and the news of the day is the relationship they build
with their law clerks. Works like Ward and Weiden’s (2006) Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years
of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court and Edward Lazarus’ (1998) Closed
Chambers recount the closeness with which justices work with their clerks, often allowing these
recent law school graduates the responsibility of writing first drafts of opinions and helping
choose cases for the Court to hear. Speaking before Congress in 2016 regarding the Court’s place
in government, Justice Breyer reasoned, “We're not up in some heaven somewhere, where we
decree things from on high, communicating directly with some mysterious source. We're part of
the government of the United States” (C-SPAN, 2015). Justice Breyer went on to reference his
own clerks’ affinity for checking in on Supreme Court blogs and news, saying, “my clerks read
them a lot” (C-SPAN, 2015). This anecdotal evidence and well documented clerk-justice
relationship helps bolster the claim of the particularly important avenue clerks offer for
connecting the justices to outside information and mentions of the Court. From anecdotes, to
bets, to the justices’ own words, the Supreme Court is not as isolated as one might think, and the
justices are as engaged as we might hope. These collected examples are only some of the
indications of a mechanism of presidential influence whereby the justices of the Supreme Court
are not only aware of elections and pay special attention to their messaging, but even become
invested in their outcomes.

recently made incendiary comments before and after the Capital riots and insurrection attempt of January 6, 2021.
She even apologized afterward to Thomas’ former and current law clerks (Barnes, 2021). Even though Justice
Thomas is not as politically engaged, we might reasonably expect him to be exposed to current political events
through his wife’s impassioned engagement.
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Crucially, news journalism spends time covering campaigns and informing the public and
Supreme Court justices alike about the positions and statements of candidates. To take just one
President as an example, Ronald Reagan’s pledge to appoint a female justice to the Supreme
Court was covered by many news organizations, including The Associated Press (Hunt, 1980), as
was his brash remark that the Supreme Court’s refusal to block the use of federal Medicaid funds
for abortions was “an abuse of power as bad as the transgressions of Watergate” (Tothberg,
1980). During his 1984 campaign for re-election, PBS NewsHour host Jim Lehrer opened the
October 9th show with two segments about the previous Sunday’s presidential debate, the first of
which was “the question of the Supreme Court and the kind and quality we may get under
presidents Mondale and Reagan” (MacNeil & Lehrer, 1980). The hosts reported on questions
over what criteria Reagan might use to pick justices, playing a video clip of presidential rival
Walter Mondale declaring his anger that “the Republican platform says that from here on out,
we’re going to have a religious test for judges before they’re selected for the federal court.” The
Court-centered issues concerned in the debate and Republican Party Platform were brought up
again later on in the show by guests and Congressmen Barney Frank and Henry Hyde, who
respectively commented “the inappropriate insertion of religion by government means…the
President tried to fuzz up what the Republican platform seemed to say,” and “those people who
adopted the platform would like to see justices who support the sanctity of innocent human life.”
All this over one sentence in the 1980 Republican Party Platform that read “We reaffirm our
support for the appointment of judges who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of
innocent human life.” Discussions of presidential campaign rhetoric concerning the Court very
often make their way into the news, as these instances of party platforms and debate
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performances show. I explore the evidence and details of this claim more in depth in Chapter 2,15
but it bears prefacing here. Anyone who has experienced an election cycle in this country can
attest to the—at times—nauseating dedication news journalism has for probing campaign
politics.
But what of newly appointed justices who were not members of the Court during the
campaign? Should we expect that what presidents say about the Court during this time affects the
behavior of these newcomers once on the bench? Presidential announcements nominating these
new justices and subsequent statements offer an indication that, yes, even those soon-to-be
justices are made aware of the priorities of their appointing president.
Those individuals who are prominent enough to attract the attention of the White House
likely practice many of the same news reading and political engagement practices as the
members already sitting on the Court. Before being nominated, these judges, lawyers, and
professors likely do hear presidential Court-centered rhetoric, but could understandably interpret
it as a critique of something external to themselves, while sitting justices might take slander or
praise of the Court as personal, and thus more powerful. This is a concern for my project, which
counts on the Court having heard and understood presidential campaign rhetoric concerning the
Judiciary. The fact that nominees to the Court do not often come from obscurity though, nor does
their selection come as a total surprise, begins to answer why my findings do not suffer from this
concern. “Short lists” have also been used for decades as a way of whittling-down potential court
nominees, and are often leaked, which has the effect of hinting to a candidate their potential and
likely future nomination. This is the first and most broad justification for why future-justices
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likely view presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric more akin to those already-sitting
justices than to normal lawyers or news consumers.
More specific and influential than just plain reading the news, newcomer justices often
can’t help but hear presidents loud and clear when they are nominated to the Court. Though
presidents don’t make a practice of demanding outcomes from their justices on national TV,
partisanship and ideology are central components of many nomination statements. As the justices
sit before the president and gathered audience, they don’t need to rely on newspapers or clerks to
tell them how the president feels about the Court, or what their preferred ideology is; they just
need to listen. The Court’s most recent nominee, Amy Coney Barrett, sat with her family as
President Trump advocated that she “decide cases based on the text of the Constitution as
written,” naming the “second amendment, our religious liberty, our public safety” and law and
order as areas of focus likely to come before the Court (Rev, 2020). Introducing judge
Sotomayor, President Obama emphasized her diverse background and lived experience as a
woman of color, noting that “what Sonia will bring to the court, then, is not only the knowledge
and experience acquired over a course of a brilliant legal career, but the wisdom accumulated
from an inspiring life's journey” (CNN, 2009). President Reagan stated that “those who sit on the
Supreme Court interpret the law of our land” when nominating Sandra Day O’Connor, which
was met with immediate questions from the press concerning O’Connor’s position on abortion
(Azcentral, 1981). Reagan followed this announcement up after her nomination by stating more
clearly that, “Judge O’Connor’s judicial philosophy is one of restraint. She believes, as she said
in her Senate testimony, that a judge is on the bench to interpret the law, not to make it” (819).
This sort of political signaling has been occurring for at least the past 50 years. President
Nixon mentioned Justice Burger’s outright conservatism when appointing him to the chief
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justiceship in 1969, commenting that “I would evaluate him as being qualified
intellectually…qualified from the standpoint of his legal philosophy” (AP Archive, 1969). After
the debacles of Carswell and Haynsworth’s failed nominations to the Court, and before
nominating Blackmun, Nixon professed that his “next nominee will be from outside the South
and he will fulfill the criteria of a strict constructionist” (Statement, 1970). More than 30 years
later, President Bush would still be using similar language when speaking about judge Roberts’
pending confirmation to the Court, hoping that “He’ll strictly apply the Constitution” and
reassuring that “He’s not going to legislate from the bench” (Remarks, 2005, 1257). When their
own nomination is concerned, not-yet-appointed and newly nominated justices cannot help but
understand what is expected of them. All this talk of legal and judicial philosophies—strict
constructionism, restraint, lived experience, and Constitutional text—are, in the political context,
key and defining statements of ideology as well as of the presidents’ desires and expectations.
But what do the Supreme Court justices actually hear? What campaign news actually
filters to their TV screens and newspaper pages? This is a nearly impossible question to answer
without asking them directly, but the collected evidence demonstrates that justices are likely to
be keenly aware of presidential priorities regarding the Court, as many on the bench follow news
and election closely and have a high chance of hearing ideological expectations directly from the
mouth of the president at the time of nomination. Additionally, those who are elevated to the
Supreme Court are at least as likely as other politically engaged Americans to hear and consume
at least the most heavily publicized messaging that presidential campaigns produce. For that
reason, I have selected a variety of campaign material for review to best cover the wide array of
election messaging that might filter to the ears of a Supreme Court justice.
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I begin with election debate performances and campaign TV advertising. These instances
of campaign messaging are perhaps the most easily and widely consumable forms of campaign
material. While ads are unavoidable if you watch TV or use the internet (and increasingly so),
debates are for many the most public announcements of campaign priorities. In 2016, nearly a
quarter of Americans tuned in to watch Hillary Clinton debate Donald Trump in late September,
while nearly as many Americans (80 million) watched Jimmy Carter debate Ronald Reagan in
1980.16
More formally, I look to what presidents say about the Court in nomination acceptance
speeches. Though they are less often seen by casual political observers, these singular addresses
represent perhaps the most concise statement of campaign values and messaging. They also
reach broad audiences on TV—beginning to be broadcast in full in 1956— and offer a “chance
to audition for the rhetorical presidency” (Hoffman & Howard, 2009, 2). I review this class of
rhetoric not assuming that all the justices hear the acceptance speeches (though undoubtedly
many do), but because they bring the most succinctly summarize general themes of the campaign
while also reaching broad audiences.17
Finally, and perhaps least apparently, I include the party platform in my dataset to best
account for overriding party themes and priorities that influence the race. Though the casual
political observer might never read them, these documents do find their way into news
coverage,18 and more importantly, capture much of the disparate and competing priorities of the

16

84 million people, out of a national population of 323 million in 2016, watched Clinton take on Trump. Roughly
80 million Americans, or over 35% of the population, watched the second general election debate in 1980 between
Reagan and Carter. These are the two most watched debates in U.S. history. Despite their outlier nature, or perhaps
because of it, they illustrate the wide audience political debate messaging can reach.
17
In 1968 President Nixon’s Nomination Acceptance Speech was reprinted in full in The New York Times as have
many since. Infra p. 51.
18
As I demonstrate in detail in Chapter 2 regarding Nixon and Clinton’s party platform priorities appearing in The
New York Times. Infra p. 51-53, 61-64.
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party and campaign. The platform is also a model for the “politics of nomination” and is thus
emblematic of an entire subsection of campaign politics (Kessel, 1977). This inclusion makes for
a fuller conception of presidential rhetoric in my project by capturing currents in party politics
that influence issues and messaging without overtly stating those priorates. Together these four
instances of presidential campaign messaging—election debate performances, TV advertising,
nomination acceptance speeches, and party platforms—best represent the overarching themes
and priorities of the campaign as well as the messaging Supreme Court justices are most likely to
be exposed to, consume, and incorporate.
Lastly, Presidential reelection bids pose a challenge for this project by complicating any
conclusions I may draw between campaign rhetoric and Court outcomes. While incumbent
presidents campaign for a second term, they also carry on their duties as president. Therefore, the
effects of presidential rhetoric and campaign rhetoric can possibly be confused and conflated.
This raises the question: might an observed change in Supreme Court voting be linked to the
effect of an incumbent president’s presidential rhetoric rather than his campaign rhetoric?
To ensure this issue doesn’t undercut my findings, I examined State of the Union
Addresses and find that in high profile cases presidents speak very rarely about the Supreme
Court when in office.19 In President Nixon’s first three State of the Union Addresses (in his
fourth year he wrote multiple State of the Union Messages instead of delivering an address) he
mentioned the Supreme Court three times, all in the same 1972 speech, and only one of the
mentions was substantive—going beyond naming who was present at the speech. In Clinton’s
first four years he never once mentioned the Supreme Court in a State of the Union Address, and
in his second term mentioned the Court only three times—twice in his fifth year and once in his
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State of the Union Addresses are used by Yates (2002) to assess the major priorities of presidents. I follow this
practice, searching these high-profile speeches for mentions of the Court.
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sixth—though none of these instances delivered any substantive or ideological message
regarding the Court. In both his first and last years as president, Clinton gave State of the Union
Messages rather than Addresses. This limited search indicates that my project’s focus on
campaign rhetoric is not particularly at risk of capturing or being skewed by non-campaign
rhetoric, as there appears to not be an overwhelming quantity of Court-centered rhetoric in major
presidential speeches. Though it is hard to be sure who exactly the justices listen to and hear, and
how greatly they may be influenced, there is a paucity of evidence to suggest that Court-centered
rhetoric from behind the Bully Pulpit is in danger of overshadowing that from the campaign.

Informed by this scholarship, in the next chapter I conduct two case studies of
presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric, looking first to President Nixon’s 1968 campaign,
and second, to President Clinton’s bid for reelection in 1996. These choices of campaigns are
purposeful to account for different political parties, time periods, and levels of incumbency.
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Chapter 2: Case Studies in Court Centered Presidential Campaign Rhetoric
In this chapter I conduct two case studies of presidential campaign rhetoric to further
explore how this type of speech addresses the Supreme Court. Moving beyond the scholarship
described in Chapter 1, I complete a close reading of President Nixon’s 1968, and President
Clinton’s 1996 party nomination acceptance speeches, election debate performances,1 campaign
TV advertising, and official party platforms for mentions of, and allusions to the Supreme Court
and related issues. Here I work to understand how the candidates speak about the Court—that is,
what language, techniques, and level of specificity they use—, in addition to what tone or mood
their language takes. Developing this understanding is key both for discovering what influence
presidential campaign rhetoric can have on the Court (as is my project), as well as for creating
my dictionary of searchable terms that indicate when the Court is a topic of discussion (which I
will address more in Chapter 3). By discovering what key words are used when candidates speak
about the Court, I can better search for these instances of Court-centered rhetoric in my complete
data set. By conducting these two case studies I hope to learn more about how presidential
candidates speak about the Court, how best to understand and categorize the tone of their
rhetoric, and finally, how I can move forward toward testing and categorizing the Court rhetoric
of other presidential campaigns.
My choices to analyze Nixon’s first term campaign in 1968 and Clinton’s second term
reelection bid in 1996 are purposeful to account for different decades, parties, levels of
incumbency, and campaign priorities. I hope to account for variations in how candidates speak

1

The 1968 presidential election had no debates. The general election contenders—Richard Nixon, Herbert
Humphrey and George Wallace—either refused or failed to compromise on how the debate would take place and
who would participate.
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about the Court that might differ by decade, and thus chose the turbulent 1960’s and the
prosperous and excited 1990’s as separate and unique political eras. Looking to understand if
candidates of one party or the other are more inclined to mention the Court, I chose a Republican
and a Democrat. Lastly, I picked a newcomer and an incumbent president to account for
potential discrepancies in Court mentions inspired by the ability of candidates to turn toward the
presidential Bully Pulpit, rather than the campaign stump speech to make their case.
Though Presidents Nixon and Clinton each faced their own impeachment scandals and
dealt with public and private controversies, the candidates were strikingly different men. Nixon
was a shrewd politician with remarkable resilience and a penchant for crafty public relations. His
political fortunes had been so haplessly dashed in the early 60's that he earned a comparison to
Dickens' Christmas Carol ("Marley was dead: to begin with") in Theodore White’s The Making
of the President, 1968 (1969, 41). Clinton’s spectacular rise to the presidency after little more
than a decade in Arkansas state government contrasts Nixon’s decade-long search for the oval
office and belies the ease with which the young politician rode his smooth-talking, saxophoneplaying demeanor to our nation’s highest office. Ultimately, Nixon’s 1968 campaign—run under
the slogan “This Time, Vote Like Your Whole World Depended On It”—and President Clinton’s
1996 re-election bid—with the tag line “Building a Bridge to the 21st-Century”—had different
priorities, with one focusing on the past while the other looked forward to a new century (Porter,
2019). In this way, and others, these two presidential campaigns are nice juxtapositions and offer
a well-balanced view of different variations of presidential campaign rhetoric.
Having run before in 1960 and served as Vice President under President Eisenhower for
eight years, Richard Nixon returned to the presidential stage in 1968 offering a new—by way of
old—vision for America. His campaign rhetoric highlighted the “forgotten American” (Nixon
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Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1968). Dressed up as a “new American revolution,” Nixon
hoped to remake a nation he considered weakened by the progressivism of the 1960’s under the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and as he saw it, inexorably tied to the liberal Chief
Justiceship of Earl Warren (Nixon Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1968). Woodward and
Armstrong would write in 1979 that “Throughout the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon had run
against Warren and his Court as much as he had run against his Democratic rival” (10). Nearly
two decades later—and returning after a prosperous four years—President Clinton’s 1996
campaign focused most on his many successes in office, his legislative agenda, and “build[ing] a
bridge to the 21st century” (Clinton Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1996). Clinton’s Court
rhetoric was more policy focused, though found no shortage of quiet references to the Court.
Ultimately, the campaigns of these two presidents balance each other nicely in terms of priorities
as well as historical context.

Richard Nixon, 1968
In 1968, Nixon rode a wave of popular discontent to the White House, preaching to the
“forgotten American” about what he saw as the ills of the previous decade, and selling his “new
American Revolution” (Nixon Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1968). In particular, Nixon and
the Republican Party were concerned with changing morals and a society they found far more
progressive than it had been during the last Republican administration in the 1950s, when Nixon
was President Eisenhower’s Vice President. Central to this fear of a changing America were
concerns over rising crime rates and the perception of lawlessness—and foundational to this
perception and rhetoric was the politics of race and racism. In 1968 alone Martin Luther King Jr.
as well as presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy were assassinated, as Hickman (2011) writes
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of that year in Courting the Right: Richard Nixon’s 1968 Campaign Against the Warren Court,
“the United States experienced domestic disquiet it had not experienced since the Great
Depression” (291).
Concerns over unrest were further fueled by the violent clashes between anti-war
demonstrators and the Chicago police that took place at the 1968 Chicago Democratic
Convention. The national disgrace would be portrayed in Nixon’s campaign ads as evidence of
the Democratic Party’s inability to govern, and was memorialized by the theatrical court trial of
the “Chicago Seven,” in which leading activists from multiple divergent left-leaning movements
why had been attacked by police were accused of organizing a riot. Interestingly, Americans
generally approved of Chicago Mayor Daley’s decision to turn police on the demonstrators, and
even approved of the police response, with majorities of 66% and 55% respectively (Brown,
2016). At the same time—though much removed from this violence—the Civil Rights and Black
Power moments were undergoing changes, causing politicians to recon with race. Racism,
domestic unrest, popular disapproval of it, and concerns over crime2 help contextualize Nixon’s
law and order rhetoric.
Nixon chose to heap much of the blame for societal change on the liberal Supreme Court
guided by fellow California native Chief Justice Earl Warren. In his book Nixon’s Court: His
Challenge to Judicial Liberalism and its Political Consequences, McMahon (2011) observes
that, “Strikingly, the institution allegedly responsible for causing much of this deterioration of
the moral fabric of American society was the Supreme Court of the United States” (8). In this
2

Americans were becoming increasingly afraid of crime in 1968. 31% of respondents in August of 1967, 35% in
September of 1968, and 42% in December of 1972 responded affirmatively to the question “Is there an area near
where you live – that is, within a mile – where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?” (Gallup, 2020).
Interestingly, Loo and Grimes (2004) argue in Polls, Politics, and Crime: The ‘Law and Order’ Issue of the 1960s
that rather than a popular response to crime, this development was an “elite-engineered moral panic” (50). Either
way, by the end of the 60s Americans cared deeply about crime, and the police action at the Democratic Convention
played an important role in shaping public opinion, even if it was in part through elite reactions to the chaos.
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way, Nixon’s campaign “devoted near-excessive attention to the Warren Court” and “it came to
exist as a vital part of Nixon’s ‘Southern Strategy’ “(Hickman, 2011, 292, 291). In turn—though
perhaps not in response—Chief Justice Warren felt no friendship toward Nixon; the judge had
tried to thwart the future president’s bid for a California House seat in 1946 and Senate seat in
1950, and had his own 1952 presidential bid torpedoed by Nixon. Woodward and Armstrong
(1979) even reported following Nixon’s election that “the Chief thought it was a catastrophe for
the country” (10). History tells us that it was as much a catastrophe for his Court’s legacy.
The Warren Court had worked diligently to recognize the rights of the criminally accused
throughout the 1960s, issuing a series of landmark rulings that protected many fundamental legal
principles we now hold dear: Mapp v. Ohio (1961) recognized “the exclusionary rule” that
evidence gathered without a warrant was inadmissible in court, Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
ordained the right to legal counsel for all, and Miranda v. Arizona (1966) made certain that
suspects heard these rights and others at the time of arrest. As Nixon’s campaign was gearing up,
United States v. Wade (1967) strengthened the right to an attorney, extending it to police lineups,
while Terry v. Ohio (1968) recognized that this line of reasoning had an outer limit, allowing
police to conduct over the clothes pat-downs of suspicious individuals without a warrant. Along
with momentous rulings in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) integrating schools, Loving v.
Virginia (1967) striking down laws against inter-racial marriage, Engel v. Vitale (1962) and
Abington School District v. Schempp (1963) effectively ending school prayer, and New York
Times v. Sullivan (1964) enshrining the freedom of the press, what would come to be termed “the
Rights Revolution” was born. This earned the Warren Court the reputation not only as a
progressive liberator, but also as having “often plunged the country into bitter controversy”
(Woodward and Armstrong, 1979, 9). Unlike most campaigns since, the 1968 presidential
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election was profoundly concerned with the Supreme Court, and thus the resulting rhetoric offers
an exciting instance to assess how some presidents speak about the Judiciary.
Tumultuous battles surrounding Court membership near the end of the 1960’s also played
a defining role in politicizing the Supreme Court, with Nixon’s 1968 election following on the
tail of two failed Supreme Court confirmations and his presidency leading to two more of his
own. The aging Warren despised Nixon and wanted desperately to ensure that he did not
nominate his replacement (Farrell, 2017). Anticipating the coming Republican victory, Warren
submitted his resignation to President Johnson in June of 1968. Promptly, the liberal Johnson
nominated Justice Abe Fortas to replace Warren as Chief Justice and Homer Thornberry to take
Fortas’ place as Associate Justice. Both of these moves were met with sturdy opposition by the
conservative Congress and within four months the nominees were withdrawn in the face of an
unyielding filibuster. Warren was forced to serve another year, Fortas was swiftly exposed by the
Nixon Justice Department for financial impropriety and resigned months later, and Nixon was
handed two open seats in his first year as president. Nixon then swapped out the Liberal Lion for
one of his outspoken critics, successfully appointing Warren Burger to fill the chief justiceship
by the summer of 1969. Congressional Democrats did not have short memories though and shotdown Nixon’s attempts to replace Fortas with Clement Haynsworth Jr. and Harrold G. Carswell,
finally voting Blackmun through 94-0 in May of 1970 to reconstitute a full nine-person Court.
The end result of this maddening fray was that President Nixon had appointed two new justices
to the Supreme Court in his first year-and-a-half. Going on to appoint a total of four justices
while in office, Nixon would immeasurably shape the Supreme Court through this most
conventional means of influence, despite (and in some ways, because) of the political
controversy that surrounded the nomination attempts of the late 1960s.
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Turning away from the political and judicial context of President Nixon’s campaign, and
toward the campaign itself, I begin my case study with a rhetorical analysis of the Nomination
Acceptance Speech Richard Nixon delivered at the Republican Party Convention in Miami
Beach, Florida on August 8th, 1968. The overarching and unabashed theme of the speech is that
of “law and order.” Decrying the current state of affairs—where “we see cities enveloped in
smoke and flame. We hear sirens in the night”—Nixon appeals to “the great majority of
Americans, the forgotten American—the non-shouters; the non-demonstrators” to offer his
“honest talk about the problem of order in the United States” (Nixon Nomination Acceptance
Speech, 1968). This rhetoric heavily implicates the Court as Nixon makes abundantly clear:
Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who serve on them. But let us
also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in
weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country and we
must act to restore that balance.
Let those who have the responsibility to enforce our laws and our judges who
have the responsibility to interpret them be dedicated to the great principles of
civil rights.
But let them also recognize that the first civil right of every American is to be free
from domestic violence, and that right must be guaranteed in this country. (Nixon
Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1968, italics added for emphasis)
Mentioning courts and judges here, Nixon uses specific language to assign blame to institutions
(courts) and individuals (judges) for the general lawlessness he sees across America. In
particular, by noting what he perceives as the central role of “some of our courts in their
decisions” having “gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces,”
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Nixon hints at what might be understood as the rulings in Mapp and Miranda that put limits on
the conduct of law enforcement. In his Nomination Acceptance Speech, Nixon sends a clear
rhetorical signal to voters, politicians, and the Court itself, that he disagrees with Court
involvement regarding the rights of the accused as having “gone too far” (Nixon Nomination
Acceptance Speech, 1968).
Nixon does also offer praise, though the context of his remarks undercuts their sincerity
in a hallmark of his judicial strategy, painting a confused portrait of his regard for the courts.
Simple statements signal support, like “Let us always respect, as I do, our courts and those who
serve on them,” (Nixon Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1968). Out of context, this could and
should be considered a positive comment, but when followed by “some of our courts in their
decisions have gone too far”— likely signaling frustration over Mapp and Miranda, as discussed
above—Nixon’s praise for the Judiciary is all but nullified (Nixon Nomination Acceptance
Speech 1968). Similarly, by counter-weighting his call for judges to be “dedicated to the great
principles of civil rights” with the suggestive remark, “[b]ut let them also recognize that the first
civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence,” Nixon seemed to be slyly
challenging some of the Court’s most important civil rights cases, likely clouding racist ideals in
the rhetoric of freedom; within the preceding decade-and-a-half Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) protected equal education for all, while Loving v. Virginia (1967) recognized interracial
marriage. Tearing down the Court and preaching the need to rebuild it was a key strategy for the
Nixon campaign in an effort to both appeal to enraged skeptics of the Court, at the same time as
maintaining the support of those mildly dissatisfied by a changing American landscape. In his
book, McMahon (2011) writes that Nixon “consider[s] his strategy of employing criticisms of
the Court as a device to destabilize the political alliance its decisions represented” (10). This
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example teaches that context matters immensely when determining the meaning of specific
language used in presidential campaign rhetoric.
Less precisely, throughout his speech at the Republican National Convention Nixon
repeated calls for restoring law and order using non-specific language and hinting not only
toward his dismay with what had taken place under the Warren Court, but also advocating a
return to an older version of America—particularly regarding criminal procedure. Speaking of
his plans to nominate a new Attorney General, Nixon boasts of “restor[ing] order and respect for
law in this country” (Nixon Nomination Acceptance Speech 1968). More abstract still, Nixon
observes that “If we are to have respect for law in America, we must have laws that deserve
respect. Just as we cannot have progress without order, we cannot have order without progress,
and so, as we commit to order tonight, let us commit to progress” (Nixon Nomination
Acceptance Speech 1968). In his rhetoric, Nixon uses this category of non-specific language to
hint heavily at anti-Court themes without mentioning the Supreme Court by name. In light of his
earlier and less opaque remarks singling out the Courts as a chief cause of lawlessness, the
potency of his real message comes through all too clear.
This sort of non-specific language gains meaning from context and related rhetoric.
Comments on “respect for law” alone are not partisan or accusatory, but within a context where
changes to the criminal justice system are hotly debated and evils of racism go unchecked (as in
the 1960’s), or more importantly, in relation to more pointed remarks naming the Court, this nonspecific language is given additional meaning. Without even mentioning the Court, non-specific
language can send implicit messaging and apply pressure to the justices and voters alike
regarding the Court.
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The Nixon campaign’s TV advertising tells much the same story of a war-torn America
in need of law and order, and though it is perhaps implied that the Court sits idly by,
unconcerned, the use of non-specific language invites the viewer to wonder. In the 1968 NixonAgnew Campaign ad “The First Civil Right” the narrator declares, “It’s time we take an honest
look at the problem of order in the United States,” continuing on to “pledge to you, we shall have
order in the United States” (Nixon/Agnew Victory Committee, 1968). More explicitly, another
1968 ad, this one titled “Crime,” recites that:
In recent years, crime in this country has grown nine times as fast as population…We
owe it to the decent and law-abiding citizens of America to take the offensive against the
criminal forces that threaten their peace and their security, and to rebuild respect for law
across this country. I pledge to you: the wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the
future in America. (Garment et al., 1968)
This rhetoric of “order” was often juxtaposed in the advertising with images of burning buildings
and police officers making arrests.
The iconography in Nixon’s ads was adapted to create contrived similarity to the
Democratic Party as well. In one ad titled “Failure,” the narrator asks, “how can a party that can't
keep order in its own back yard hope to keep order in our fifty states?” while images of
Democratic leaders and constituents, anti-war protesters in Chicago, and burning buildings and
gun-wielding criminals play on the screen (Garment et al., “Failure,” 1968). Even messages
regarding unity were imbued with the rhetoric of law and order and crime, as another 1968 ad
advocates for “leadership that believes in law and has the courage to enforce it” (Garment et al.,
“Unite,” 1968). Nixon’s campaign advertising used non-specific language to paint a picture of a
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crumbling America in need of saving. Viewers who had heard Nixon speak before though—
railing against a runaway Court—might well intuit who was to blame.
Other rhetoric from Nixon’s 1968 campaign reinforces the central messaging of his
nomination acceptance speech and TV advertising. Law and order as an issue was central to the
Republican Party Platform as a priority of Nixon’s campaign, just as it was inherently tied to the
Court. Using non-specific language to state that “We must re-establish the principle that men are
accountable for what they do, [and] that criminals are responsible for their crimes,” the Party
joined Nixon in voicing a desire to “re-establish” what the Warren Court had upended
(Republican Party Platform, 1968). The Platform adds specifics that make hints toward
identifiable cases, complaining of changes made to “laws enabling law enforcement officials to
obtain and use evidence needed to prosecute criminals” (Republican Party Platform, 1968). The
protections Mapp and Miranda enshrined for criminal defendant are likely implicated here,
though without mentioning either of the cases, nor even naming the Court or its justices. This is
the hallmark of non-specific language—biting hints without mentioning the Court by name.
The Republican Party Platform continues on to appeal to more law and order concerns,
striking a tedious balance between hardline conservative backlash to the Warren Court’s rulings,
and maintaining respect for the institution of the Court typical of the Nixon campaign’s desire
for broad public appeal. The Platform states that “Public confidence in an independent judiciary
is absolutely essential to the maintenance of law and order…we pledge a determined effort to
rebuild and enhance public respect for the Supreme Court and all other courts in the United
States” (Republican Party Platform, 1968). McMahon (2011) recognized this seemingly
inconsistent judicial messaging whereby Nixon both praised and criticized the Court, explaining
that to the candidate "electoral success was more important than advancing an ideologically
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consistent brand of judicial conservatism” (7). By working to undermine some of the rulings of
the Court, while claiming to be its champion, Richard Nixon worked to destabilize trust in the
proceeding decade of caselaw and push for his own Court agenda that included undoing much of
that progress.
Central to Nixon’s rhetoric on crime was the racism that permeated much of 1968
election. Though the theme of race often went unspoken, in many ways it defined politics in the
1960s and played a fundamental and systematic role in the political issues of the day. After
reporting on the election, Theodore White wrote in 1969 that “law-and-order had descended
through American politics wrapped in the rhetoric of the right” and that “the issue of crime and
its control became webbed, sickeningly, with racism” (189, 193). Nixon’s “southern strategy”—
whereby the Republican party adopted the South as President Johnson signed away the former
Democratic stronghold with the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act—
depended heavily on signaling to southern racists a fealty to their cause while saving face with
the rest of America. Nixon’s campaign “became particularly adept at using coded language and
going just far enough in its rhetoric to ensure that race connected to these problems of
lawlessness,” Hickman (2011, 293) writes. Woodward and Armstrong concur, that “Nixon's
pronouncements during his campaign as well as the winks, nods and private assurances, had
fueled another drive of Southern resistance" (11). Infamous political operative Lee Atwater gave
a more damning account of this era of political posturing and coded non-specific language in a
1981 interview:
You start out in 1954 by saying, “Ni**er, ni**er, ni**er.” By 1968 you can’t say
“ni**er”…So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff,
and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all
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these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of
them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites. (As quoted in Perlstein, 2012)

In addition to the systemic racism that pervaded Nixon’s language, his coded campaign
rhetoric often fell back on the Court. McMahon (2011) writes that “Nixon sharpened his ‘law
and order’ appeal so much so that, as journalist Liva Baker writes, he nearly made "it sound as if
[Justices] Black and Douglas and Bill Brennan and Earl Warren all were out on the streets
themselves, egging on the criminals, as if they… created crime" (35). Likely aware of these
criticisms, Nixon countered in his Party Nomination Acceptance Speech that “to those who say
that law and order is the code word for racism, there and here is a reply: Our goal is justice for
every American” (Nixon Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1968). Almost as if to prove the point,
Nixon was unable to clearly dispel the criticism, rather choosing to make another presumably
coded remark about the generally applicable goal of justice instead of decrying the racism he
helped stoke.
But was Nixon’s campaign perceived then as historians remember it today, or has the
keen eye of history stained his reputation? As importantly, can we reasonably expect the justices
to have absorbed Nixon’s messaging while reading the Sunday paper or watching the news? By
surveying the headlines of The New York Times during the week of the 1968 Republican
Convention it is clear that Nixon’s rhetoric of law and order, and even his references to the
Court, were not lost on the American news media. The full transcript of Nixon’s Nomination
Acceptance Speech was printed in the paper, while 13 articles ran about the Republican Party
Platform—and included the word “platform” in the title—in the first 10 days of August as the
convention played out. In one instance the headline of The Times on August 9th, the day after the
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end of the convention, even mentioned Nixon’s focus on crime, reading “Nixon Selects Agnew
as his Running Mate and Wins Approval After Fight on Floor Pledges End of War, Toughness
on Crime” (Headline, 1968). Other articles touched on specifics of the party platform, from an
August 5th piece titled “Rockefeller Coup Gave Platform a Dovish Tone” detailing specific
changes to Vietnam policy (Finney, 1968) to actual excerpts of the Platform proposals on August
4th (“Excerpts From the Republican Platform Proposed by Committee on Resolutions,” 1968).
More to the point, on August 7th The Times published an article about Nixon meeting
with Southerners to discuss judges and the Court. Summarizing the interaction, the article states
that Nixon “preferred those who attempted to interpret rather than make the law, and that he did
not think it proper for judges to act as local school boards.” Rightly so, the article continues,
“[t]his was interpreted by the Southerners as a slap at Federal courts that have ordered
desegregation of schools” (“Nixon Said to Bar Southerners’ Bid,” 1968). This sort of
contemporaneous reporting demonstrates that not only Nixon’s rhetoric resembles what we now
remember it as, but that it was interpreted as such at the time. More important still, the details of
Nixon’s campaign rhetoric were widely available and publicized to even the casual media
consumer—your average politically engaged American as well as Supreme Court justices. While
campaign ads and debates (when they happen) garner considerable viewership by virtue of their
format, this evidence from The New York Times supports the claim that even the less accessible
party platform and nomination acceptance speeches are covered in high-circulation newspapers.
Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign used both specific language and the non-specific
language of often coded references to Court decisions to critique and undermine the Supreme
Court and a selection of its rulings, as well as offering an alternative vision of “restoring” what
had existed before the progressive Warren Court era. This aggressive tactic of attacking the
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Court was utilized by the third-party candidate George Wallace as well—though in more
unabashedly racist terms— as McMahon (2011) writes, “Nixon and Wallace could hardly stop
talking about the Court, making it a central piece of their standard stump speeches” (36). In an
interview given by Wallace he named “law and order” as a principal issue in the 1968 campaign,
further implicating the Court in this debate by exclaiming that, “Crime in the Streets. The people
are going to be fed up with the sissy attitude of Lyndon Johnson…They’re fed up with the
Supreme Court that…it's a sorry, lousy, no-account outfit" (White, 1969, 346). No clearer a
statement could have been uttered linking the Supreme Court to the pervasive rhetoric of crime.
In this way and others, Wallace played a role in pushing Nixon to the right as the Southerner
posed a genuine risk to Nixon’s hold on the South and bid for office. In a New York Times article
from September 20th, 1968 titled “Wallace Shadow Causes Nixon to Consider a 3rd Party
Appeal,” Robert B. Semple Jr. writes that “there are very good reasons why Mr. Nixon might—
as a tactical matter—seek to appeal to Wallace sentiment and convert it to his cause.”3 At the
same time, Wallace’s relative extremism may have helped Nixon appear more moderate.
Nonetheless, the fact of Wallace and Nixon’s exuberance did not detract from the reality that the
“eagerness to challenge the justices in such a confrontational fashion symbolized a dramatic
change” (McMahon, 2011, 35). But what effect did this have on the justices, and how did other
presidents address the Court?

3

A New York Magazine article from 2018 noted of Wallace that “He was enough of a threat to Nixon in the
southern border states that the Republican [Nixon] began echoing his racist dog whistles, often through the “law and
order” styling of his own running mate, Spiro Agnew” (Kilgore).
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Bill Clinton, 1996
In 1996 Bill Clinton became the first Democratic President elected to a second term since
FDR, focusing much of his campaign on the successes of the previous four years and offering to
“build a bridge to the 21st century” (Clinton Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1996). He also
became the only Democratic president ever reelected without a Democratic Congress, as the
Republican Congress ushered in under Newt Gingrich’s 1994 “Contract with America” held
strong through the 1996 election (Stephenson, 1999, 191). Bill Clinton’s persistent success is
indicative of his remarkable popularity as the president who presided over the longest peacetime
economic expansion in American history—an oft cited, yet nonetheless extraordinary statistic.
The former Arkansas Attorney General and Governor was a New Democrat who championed
compromise in his many substantive legislative accomplishments as president, guiding America
through a politically turbulent eight years, weathering impeachment, and leaving office with
remarkably high approval.
Clinton’s many successes and scandals, and famed smooth talking, cooperative demeanor
occupy much of his political legacy, and leave little room for the memory of what proved to be
crafty, if limited rhetoric toward the Supreme Court. As Clinton took office for the second time
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s final decade at the head of the Supreme Court was beginning. Having
helped push the Court steadily to the right throughout his time, Rehnquist had presided over the
continual whitling-away of affirmative action, and the ending of racial quotas in University of
California v. Bakke (1979), City of Richmond v. JA Croson (1989), and Aderand Constructors v.
Penn (1995). Advancing a conservative Court agenda again in the year before Clinton’s
reelection campaign, Rehnquist was a part of the majority in U.S. v. Lopez (1995), in which the
Court overturned Congress’ Gun Free School Zones Act, both limiting the Federal Government’s
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Commerce Clause power to regulate and damaging attempts to curb Second Amendment
protections. Stephenson (1999) writes in Campaigns and the Court: The Supreme Court in
Presidential Elections that since the end of Chief Justice Warren’s term in 1968 “no realignment
in the traditional sense ha[d] occurred on the Court, and a general conservative bend had set in”
(190).
Clinton’s 1996 reelection campaign on the surface chose to ignore much of this
movement right though, having already attempted this strategy in his first campaign in 1992
when he famously announced a litmus test for his Court nominees to support Roe v. Wade’s
constitutional protection for abortion (Stephenson, 1999, 1). Proving more the rule than the
exception, in that same year the Republican National Platform pushed for a Human Life
Amendment. Clinton, himself a lawyer, was certainly not afraid to speak about, or out against the
Court, but his 1996 presidential campaign focused instead on his own accomplishments and
vision for the nation rather than on critiques of the Court. A simple search of the New York
Times Archive Database for “Bill Clinton Supreme Court” illustrates that the vast majority of
news coverage relating to the President and the Supreme Court focused on Clinton’s own legal
trouble, or his decision to exit the Supreme Court Bar.4 This popular ignorance of Clinton’s
Court agenda does not mean though that his rhetoric avoided Court matters all together.
Speaking in Chicago on August 29th, 1996, Bill Clinton accepted the Democratic Party
nomination with soaring rhetoric highlighting the successes of the past four years, and his vision
for the next four; throughout he also spoke strategically about judicial matters that related to his
accomplishments and vision. Unlike Clinton’s calls for a litmus test four years earlier, his

4

An article about Clinton’s own agenda for the Court does not appear until the ninth search result, returning a 1999
piece by Linda Greenhouse titled “Clinton Urges Supreme Court to Uphold the Miranda Decision” which focuses
more on the actions of the Justice Department and Attorney General Janet Reno than it does President Clinton
(Greenhouse, 1999).
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rhetoric in 1996 avoided specific praise or condemnation of the Court, instead focusing on the
issues before the justices. An important difference between Nixon’s campaign rhetoric and
Clinton’s was that President Clinton had already appointed two members of the Court. Using
non-specific language, and few specific references, Clinton’s campaign rhetoric touched on
abortion, gun rights, religious freedom, and campaign finance. Throughout, the President held
the Constitution close, stating unequivocally (and unsurprisingly), “I believe in the Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of Independence; I believe in religious liberty; I believe in
freedom of speech; I believe in working hard and playing by the rules” (Clinton Nomination
Acceptance Speech, 1996). President Clinton’s message of forward progress strikes a markedly
different tone than Nixon’s stated desire to return to a bygone Court era, though similarly, still
pushes for an agenda beneath the rhetorical vagaries. Championing the Constitution as well as
policy proposals in his Nomination Acceptance Speech, in the Democratic Party Platform, and in
ads and Election Debate performances in Hartford and San Diego, Clinton’s campaign rhetoric is
focused, detailed, and persuasive, as well as surprisingly Court oriented.
President Clinton’s campaign rhetoric used specific language to name the constitutional
protection for abortion enshrined in Roe v. Wade (1973), affirming his and the Party’s unyielding
support for abortion rights. The 1996 Democratic Party Platform made this abundantly clear:
“The Democratic Party stands behind the right of every woman to choose, consistent with Roe v.
Wade, and regardless of ability to pay… We believe it is a fundamental constitutional liberty”
(Democratic Party Platform, 1996). The tactic of naming “Roe” uses specific language to
identify the case and issue before the Court, and to clearly distinguish President Clinton and the
Party’s support. Clinton also spoke in his famous conciliatory fashion about the right to an
abortion at the convention, stating that “We respect the individual conscience of every American
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on the painful issue of abortion but believe as a matter of law that this decision should be left to a
woman, her conscience, her doctor, and her God. But abortion should not only be safe and legal,
it should be rare” (Clinton Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1996). Here President Clinton
reaffirmed his support for abortion, notwithstanding his hope that it happens rarely. Both of these
statements not only name the implicated right—and in the first case, the related Court decision—
but both likely reference the then-recent Court decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)
which upheld the central holding of Roe (that abortions are constitutionally protected), but at the
same time created a new, stricter and less clear judicial standard: the undue burden test
(Stephenson 1999, 216).5 President Clinton’s campaign rhetoric used specific language to
reaffirm his and the Party’s support for Roe v. Wade and the right to a legal abortion in light of
persistent challenges and a recent Court ruling in Casey that risked undermining the wellestablished liberty.
At other times, President Clinton’s campaign used specific language to name the Court
and cases before it, going as far as to describe litigation the administration was involved in. For
example, the Party Platform used specific language to state the administration’s support for the
Safe and Drug Free Schools Act and noted that “The Clinton Administration went to the
Supreme Court to support the right of schools to test athletes for drugs” (Democratic Party
Platform, 1996). Addressing advocacy before the Court is significant, and describing a case to
the world as an example of the work of the administration would likely not go unnoticed.
Clinton’s support for both religious freedom and equal rights involved rhetoric around
legislation and constitutional amendments, combining specific and non-specific language to push

5

Stenberg v. Carhart (2000) further reinforced the protection when Nebraska’s late term abortion ban got struck
down as an undue burden, as the alternate procedure is more dangerous. This was a victory for Clinton’s rhetorical
side of the argument.
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judicial ideas though not name specific cases. In particular, the 1996 Democratic Party Platform
stated support for the Violence Against Women Act6 and the Equal Rights Amendment, as well
as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) (Democratic Party Platform, 1996). Debating
Bob Dole in San Diego, President Clinton remarked that “one of my proudest moments was
signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which says the Government's got to bend over
backwards before we interfere with religious practice.” Clinton goes on to say that “we don’t
need a constitutional amendment for kids to pray” noting the work his Justice and Education
Departments had done to protect religious expression short of such a drastic measure (San Diego
Presidential Debate, 1996).
This sort of third way—supporting RFRA while not supporting a constitutional
amendment for religious expression—was typical of Clinton’s approach to politics and judicial
matters, as he stated in San Diego “what I’ve tried to do is to support policies that would respect
religion…our administration has done more than any in 30 years to clarify the freedom of
religion in the public square, including in the public schools” (San Diego Presidential Debate,
1996). Though intended to put to rest the long, controversial, and often shifting line of Court
caselaw grappling with religion, what constitutes belief in a religion,7 and what one can do with
that belief,8 RFRA instead led to City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) where the law was found

6

Four years later in U.S. v. Morrison (2000), the Supreme Court would rule the Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional as it had no economic component and was thus not permitted as federal regulation under Commerce
Clause power.
7
Reynolds v. U.S. (1879) – Religions are those practice at the time of the framing. Davis v. Benson (1890) –
Religion is a belief in God, U.S. v. Ballard (1944) – Religion is defined by the sincerity, not truth, of the belief. U.S.
v. Seeger (1965) – Religion is “parallel to a belief in a supreme being.” Welsch v. U.S. (1970) – Religion is a belief
in “morality, ethics and sincerity” (modern standard).
8
Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) – A law that infringes on religion must be secular and have a valid reason.
Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) – If a law is secular and has a valid reason/interest it must only infringe on religion in the
least restrictive means. Sherbert v. Verner (1963) – The degree to which one’s way of life is inseparable from their
religious practice must be balanced with the state interest when gagging how a law infringes on religious freedom.
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) – Sherbert state interest must be balanced with not unduly burdening free exercise.
Oregon v. Smith (1990) – Religious beliefs do not excuse someone from following otherwise valid laws.
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unconstitutional on enforcement grounds. RFRA was short-lived as a law, though more
importantly, President Clinton’s support was an example of how non-specific and specific
language can join together to push for an issue rather than for or against the Court or a specific
case.
To take one of those issues, gun rights, President Clinton’s campaign rhetoric
championed his success passing the Brady Bill, using non-specific language to support an issue
that not two years later appeared before the Court in a landmark ruling. The Party Platform
praised Clinton’s direction, noting that “with his leadership, we made the Brady Bill the law of
the land. And because we did, more than 60,000 felons, fugitives, and stalkers have been stopped
from buying guns” (Democratic Party Platform, 1996). Speaking at the first General Election
Debate in Hartford, Connecticut, Clinton boasted, “We've expanded the Brady bill to cover
people who beat up their spouses and their kids. And this is a safer country. So I'm glad I took on
that fight” (Hartford, CT, Debate, 1996). Two years later the Supreme Court took on that fight as
well, ruling in Printz v. U.S. (1997) that the federal government cannot require local law
enforcement to do background checks for Brady Bill’s mandated waiting period. This fit into the
seeming war on gun regulations the Court was taking part in, having ruled in U.S. v. Lopez
(1995) that the Gun Free School Zones Act was unconstitutional as it had no connection to
commerce. Here President Clinton’s non-specific language clearly portrayed a gun-control
agenda, and thus expressed an ideological preference to the justices without ever mentioning the
Court.
Speaking to a political issue that had more far-reaching historical implications for the
Court, President Clinton used non-specific language to champion campaign finance reform,
though sold the idea as a legislative concern not a judicial matter. Speaking at the Convention in
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1996, Clinton asked the crowd, “we've got one more thing to do. Will you help me get campaign
finance reform in the next 4 years?” (Clinton Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1996). The crowd
erupted in cheers and applause. The Democratic Party Platform reiterated Clinton’s message,
naming “the bipartisan McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform bill” as a priority
(Democratic Party Platform, 1996). Passed in 2002 as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA), Clinton and the Democratic party hoped that it would “limit campaign spending, curb
the influence of PACs and lobbyists, and end the soft money system….[and] provide free TV
time for candidates, so they can talk directly to citizens about real issues and real ideas”
(Democratic Party Platform, 1996). Clinton’s stated support for this bold legislative proposal in
1996 came almost two decades after the last major pieces of federal election legislation were
passed in the 1970s,9 as well as the Supreme Court’s striking down of limits on independent
expenditures as a constraint on political speech in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). From the time
Clinton spoke it would be another six years until the law was passed, seven years until the law
was just barely upheld by the Court in McConnell v. FEC (2003), and another fourteen years
until Citizens United v. FEC (2010) opened the floodgates for campaign finance law, dashing the
hopes of Clinton and the BCRA. Clinton’s campaign rhetoric on election financing is yet another
example of how the President spoke to his judicial priorities without naming the Supreme Court
or the cases involved, using non-specific language to point toward general issues and policies
that implicated the Court.
Campaign TV advertising reinforced Clinton’s rhetoric concerning the Court, using both
specific and non-specific language to include a Court agenda in campaign priorities. An ad from
1996 titled “Drums” reads "Dole-Gingrich... Against a Woman's right to choose…Against The

9

The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and subsequent amendments to it.
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Brady Bill & Assault weapons ban…Clinton/Gore. Brady Bill signed” (The November 5 Group,
1996). This ad targets two issues that implicate the Court to varying degrees, clearly referencing
the protection for abortion in Roe v. Wade, and less specifically alluding to the general threat the
Courts posed to gun legislation such as the Brady Bill (as Printz would make clear one year
later). Another ad from that year notes that “[a]n independent watchdog cites Dole as the senator
‘most responsible for blocking any serious campaign finance reform” (The November 5 Group,
“Desperate,” 1996). This dig references not only the fierce debate surrounding campaign finance
reform that had ignited in Congress in the late 90’s, but also plays into the Court history of
FECA and Buckley v. Valeo (1976) that so define the issue. Though brief, these messages not
only indicate the significance the campaign placed on a woman’s right to choose, The Brady
Bill, and the assault weapons ban, and campaign finance reform, but to varying degrees,
implicate the Court in all of these campaign priorities.
President Bill Clinton’s reelection rhetoric in the 1996 presidential campaign was
detailed and driven, proud of the progress his administration had made over the past four years,
forward looking to the next four, and steadily, and surprisingly strategic in regard to the Court.
Hidden behind a facade of legislative concerns, Clinton addressed many issues that at the least
related to the Court, and at most sent direct messages of support or critique to the nine justices
and the voters. He used specific language to speak to issues related to the Court when supporting
the right to an abortion (naming Roe), while also using specific language to champion the Equal
Rights Amendment, the Violence Against Women Act, and a victim’s rights amendment.
Relatedly, he blended specific and non-specific language when speaking of religious freedom
(RFRA), advocating strong support for the fraught constitutional protection. Finally, and most
interestingly, President Clinton used non-specific language—as Nixon had with crime and states’
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rights—to state positions on gun rights and campaign finance reform; without being critical nor
provocative toward the Court and its rulings, Clinton asserted his positions clearly.
As with Nixon’s campaign rhetoric, The New York Times covered and analyzed Clinton’s
Party Platform as well as his Nomination Acceptance Speech in detail. Here the President’s
rhetoric was interpreted as focused on progress and getting things done. The morning after
Clinton delivered his Nomination Acceptance Speech to end the Convention, The New York
Times ran the headline “Clinton, Declaring ‘Hope is Back,’ Defends his First Term and Lists
Plans for Second.” The article that followed noted how Clinton “blended outsized optimism with
small-scale proposals” (Purdum, 1996). Clines (1996) also wrote a rather self-explanatory
dispatch titled “A Rousing Address Revives Throng of Stunned Delegates” which quoted one
delegate as calling the speech the “Main event.”
As for coverage of the Party Platform, three days before, on August 27th, the Times ran a
comparison between the Democratic Party Platform and its Republican counterpart, with sections
that at least tacitly implicated Supreme Court precedents, from “Abortion” and “Gun Control,” to
“Affirmative Action,” and others (“Party Platforms: How they Compare,” 1996). An article
excerpting parts of the platform also ran, as well as two opinion pieces, one noting how perfectly
tailored the platform was to Clinton’s campaign priorities, and another addressing the role of
terrorism policy in the document (“Platform Politics,” 1996) (“Excerpts from Platform Adopted
at Democratic Convention,” 1996) (Rosenthal, 1996). Earlier in the summer, NPR’s “Morning
Edition” had covered the early stages of the platform writing process, noting that “Democrats
produced a draft platform that largely mirrors the policies of the Clinton Administration,” and
discussing liberal support for protecting abortion rights (“Democrats Enjoy Unity in PlatformBuilding Process,” 1996). Months later, NPR’s Nina Totenberg would accurately sum up on air
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what the dominant perception was of Clinton’s Court rhetoric, observing that “If Clinton is reelected, I suspect the Court won’t change quite as much, but if he replaces chief justice
Rehnquist, the balance on affirmative action questions might change” (“Social Controversies
Arrive on Supreme Court Docket,” 1996).
The contemporaneous reporting focused most on Clinton’s forward-looking proposals
and language, reiterating how Clinton was “pledging over and over again to ‘build a bridge to the
21st century” (Purdum, 1996). Though reporting from the 27th notes some of the substantive
policy proposals such as “expanding handgun-control laws to deny guns to those convicted of
domestic violence and abuse,” the bulk of the news coverage highlighted Clinton’s rhetorical
thrust toward the future (Rosenthal, 1996). Further coverage of the convention ranged from a
fiery critique of Clinton by Maureen Dawd titled “Le Parti, C’est Moi” (1996) to a simple
“Convention Summary” (1996). Though the commentary tended toward the politics and
generalities of the Convention, the quantity and breadth of coverage, as well as the mentions of
court-related policy areas, again indicate that Nomination Acceptance Speeches and Party
Platforms are widely reported on in The Newspaper of Record.10 Justices reading the news, like
millions across America opening up the paper, could read about Clinton’s policy agenda as a
forward-thinking legislative program, at times concerning issues that implicated the Court, but
never fully taking on the institution.
Emblematic of a Third Way of speaking about judicial issues without overtly critiquing
or praising the Court, President Clinton stated unequivocally at the San Diego General Election

10

The New York Times also covered political TV ads and debates as well, with stories on how “Experts Say
Negative Ads Will be Around for a While” (Kolbert 1996) and on the “New Arena for Ads and Political Influence”
(Labaton, 1996), as well as how “In a Debate, It’s Themes, Not Facts” (Rosenbaum, 1996) and “For Both Camps in
Final Debate, Hopes, Risks and a Few Surprises” (Berke, 1996). Though ads and debates are shown on TV, it is
important to note that their messages can be reiterated in the newspaper for those who may not watch.

64
Debate in 1996 “I am against quotas; I'm against giving anybody any kind of preference for
something they're not qualified for, but because I still believe that there is some discrimination
and that not everybody has an opportunity to prove they are qualified, I favor the right kind of
affirmative action” (San Diego Presidential Debate, 1996). This sort of language references years
of Supreme Court precedent11 without challenging the Court directly nor naming those
precedents. President Clinton’s 1996 campaign spoke a surprising amount about issues that
concerned the Supreme Court; not remembered as having had particularly turbulent nor forceful
Court rhetoric, understanding Clinton’s non-specific language thus often hinges on context.

Through these two case studies it is evident that every president speaks about the Court
and their judicial agenda in their own way, but that it is possible to categorize Court centered
campaign rhetoric both by theme and by type of language used. Nixon’s 1968 campaign rhetoric
addressed the Court when speaking about criminal procedure and federalism concerns, and
generally struck a critical tone, using strategic references to “law and order” and past Court eras
as well as specific language to name the Court and its justices. Clinton’s 1996 campaign rhetoric
spoke to judicial concerns through legislative priorities such as victim’s rights, equal rights, gun
rights, religious freedom and campaign finance, touting past and future bills and amendments to
clearly enunciate Court concerns. Both campaigns used specific language and non-specific
language to articulate support and criticism for the Court and its related issues. Further, it

11

University of California v. Bakke (1979) ruled racial quotas in college admission unconstitutional. City of
Richmond v. JA Croson (1989) stuck down a 30% quota for black owned businesses for government contractors.
Metro Broadcasting v. FECC (1990) upheld government use of socioeconomic status in a performance program as a
non-quota. Adarand Constructors v. Penn (1995) struck a federal program that preferred contractors that used
minority-run subcontractors.
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appears that both newcomers and incumbents speak about the Court, and that political party does
not necessarily shape rhetoric.
Moving beyond my case studies and toward the other 12 presidential elections since 1968
it is important to understand what constitutes specific and non-specific language, as well as how
to identify each. Specific language is when the court(s) is mentioned, as well as justice(s),
judge(s), and Roe. Non-specific language is language that references the Court, its cases, and its
justices without naming any of those things. Statements of approval and disapproval for issues
like abortion, affirmative action, school prayer and other areas where the Supreme Court has had
a major influence fall into this category. This kind of language is made stronger and more easily
identifiable when it accompanies previously stated specific language, because both the topic and
ideological thrust are often clearer in those instances. While specific language is easier to search
for as it necessarily includes specific terms, non-specific language is much more difficult to find
and standardize. Importantly though, as non-specific language is not overtly Court related, when
it makes its way into popular media it is often not reflected as a Court issue, and thus does not
risk impacting the Court to the same extent.
My case studies also teach that the context of campaign rhetoric matters immensely. As
Nixon’s 1968 speech showed, even praise for the Court can play a role in criticism of the
institution when followed by critical language. Therefore, each time specific language is used, it
is imperative to analyze the entire comment to determine not only the positive or negative bend
of the remark, but its sincerity as well. Nonspecific language requires a complete understand of
context to an even greater extent; when Nixon spoke of law and order he was likely playing into
a coordinated and concerted effort to rally southern voters to the Republican Party’s coded cause.
When Clinton noted that “Today’s Democratic Party believes the first responsibility of
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government is law and order” it meant a very different thing, the 1994 Crime Bill having
recently been passed, the implication of law and order was evolving (Democratic Party Platform,
1996). In this sense, to understand and classify Court centered presidential campaign rhetoric
properly it is necessary to not only search for specific language but understand the context as
well. This is rather self-explanatory, but nonetheless imperative to understand to properly
conduct the remainder of my project.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methods
Data
In order to explore the relationship between presidential campaign rhetoric and Supreme
Court voting I compare how presidents speak about the Court on the campaign trail in elections
from 1968 through 2016 to Supreme Court case outcomes during the 1969-2019 Court terms.
Specifically, I test how the ideological thrust or push of the winning presidential candidate’s
Court-centered campaign rhetoric in an election year affects the outcomes of decisions by the
Court in the following 4 terms. I also look at how Court outcomes are influenced by other factors
such as presidential approval, public mood, and Court ideology. Finally, I conduct a qualitative
assessment of specific instances of pointed presidential campaign rhetoric and their
consequences in Court outcomes and opinions.
The data I use to describe Court-centered presidential campaign rhetoric comes from the
election debate performances, party nomination acceptance speeches, party platforms, and
popular TV advertising of winning presidential nominees from 1968-2016. The transcripts of the
first three types of rhetoric are accessed through the UCSB Presidency Project (Peters &
Woolley, 2021), while the TV ads are archived by The Living Room Candidate (Museum of the
Moving Image, 2021). Importantly, every election debate in which the winning presidential
candidate participates is included in my corpus of Court-centered campaign rhetoric. In addition
to general election debates, this corpus includes party primary debates as well as the odd instance
where one major party candidate debates a third-party candidate without the presence of the
opposing major party challenger—as, for example, Ronald Reagan did in 1980, debating
Congressman John Anderson who was running as an Independent (Reagan-Anderson, 1980).
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While the number of total debates winning presidential candidates have taken part in
ranges from 0 in 1968 and 1972, to 9 in 2016, each winning presidential candidate has given one
and only one nomination acceptance speech every four years, as each party convention has only
nominated one candidate for president. Therefore, for each presidential cycle I review the single
nomination acceptance speech given by the winning presidential candidate. Similarly, I include
the one-and-only party platform from the party of the winning presidential candidate for every
election since 1968. Finally, I review all ads for the winning candidate presented on the Living
Room Candidate website. With an apparent proliferation of ads created by outside groups in
recent year, this cite contains both these outside ads as well as those made by the candidate’s
principal campaign committee. Thus, ads can come from the national party committee—such as
the Democratic National Committee—from groups like the NRA or Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth—as did a 2004 attack ad on John Kerry’s military service—or from the candidate’s
committee directly, like President Obama’s 2012 campaign committee “Obama for America.”
The other major source of data for this project comes from the Supreme Court Database
(Spaeth et al., 2020), which I use to track and classify Supreme Court outcomes. The Court
Centered data provides a citation and year for each case, as well as the outcome and issue area
concerned in the case. Case outcomes are coded as conservative (1), liberal (2), or unspecified
(3) in the decisionDirection variable. Generally, liberal (2) outcomes in civil liberties cases are
those that favor the individual, minorities, civil rights, due process, and privacy, while
conservative (1) outcomes are made up of the opposite.1 In cases concerning unions and

1

Liberal (2) outcomes are: “Pro-person accused or convicted of crime, or denied a jury trial; pro-civil liberties or
civil rights claimant, especially those exercising less protected civil rights (e.g., homosexuality); pro-child or
juvenile; pro-indigent; pro-Indian; pro-affirmative action; pro-neutrality in establishment clause cases; pro-female in
abortion; pro-underdog; anti-slavery; incorporation of foreign territories; anti-government in the context of due
process, except for takings clause cases where a pro-government, anti-owner vote is considered liberal except in
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economic activity, liberal (2) outcomes tend to be found where the union, the consumer, the
government, or the worker win, and not when the corporation prevails, as occurs in most
conservative (1) outcomes.2 Additionally, liberal (2) outcomes tend to be pro-court in judicial
power cases, pro-federal government in federalism cases, and pro-U.S. in federal taxation issues,
while conservative (1) votes are defined by the opposite (Spaeth et al., 2020).
As for the issue area concerned in each case, the issueArea variable contains 14
possibilities,3 the first five of which comprise civil liberties issues, leaving the remaining nine as
non-civil liberties issues. Importantly, in an effort to tailor my project more precisely to the
specific nature or type of Court-centered rhetoric, I conduct my analysis of both presidential
rhetoric and court outcomes using civil liberties cases and non-civil liberties cases separately.
Both the criteria for liberal and conservative Court outcomes and the definitions of issue areas
help inform my own coding and classification of not only Court cases but presidential rhetoric as
well.
In addition to data that tests whether presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric
influences Supreme Court outcomes, I also include three control variables in my analysis. These

criminal forfeiture cases or those where the taking is pro-business; violation of due process by exercising
jurisdiction over nonresident; pro-attorney or governmental official in non-liability cases; pro-accountability and/or
anti-corruption in campaign spending; pro-privacy vis-a-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that of
mental incompetents; pro-disclosure in Freedom of Information Act issues except for employment and student
records” (Spaeth et al., 2020).
2

Liberal (2) outcomes in union and economic activity: “pro-union except in union antitrust where liberal = procompetition; pro-government; anti-business; anti-employer; pro-competition; pro-injured person; pro-indigent; prosmall business vis-a-vis large business; pro-state/anti-business in state tax cases; pro-debtor; pro-bankrupt; proIndian; pro-environmental protection; pro-economic underdog; pro-consumer; pro-accountability in governmental
corruption; pro-original grantee, purchaser, or occupant in state and territorial land claim; anti-union member or
employee vis-a-vis union; anti-union in union antitrust; anti-union in union or closed shop; pro-trial in arbitration.”
Conservative votes have the opposite outcomes (Spaeth et al., 2020).

3

1- Criminal Procedure, 2- Civil Rights, 3- First Amendment, 4- Due Process, 5- Privacy, 6- Attorneys, 7- Unions,
8- Economic Activity, 9- Judicial Power, 10- Federalism, 11- Interstate Relations, 12- Federal Taxation, 13Miscellaneous, 14- Private Action (Spaeth et al., 2020).
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Control Variables are Court ideology, public mood, and presidential approval. Court ideology is
created and measured using the Martin Quinn (MQ) scores4 (Martin and Quinn, 2020) of the
median justice on the Court to estimate the average ideological disposition of the Court as a
whole, given that a fifth vote is needed for a winning coalition.5 To account for public mood—
which, as my literature review makes clear, holds a strong potential to influence the Court—I use
the Stimson Public Mood Index’s annual metric (Stimson, 2019). Presidential approval is
compiled by calculating annual averages of Gallup’s presidential popularly poll, which asks “Do
you approve or disapprove of the way [enter President name] is handling his job as President?”
(Peters & Woolley, 2021).

Methods: Modeling the Influence of Presidential Campaign Rhetoric
Dependent Variable
My dependent variable (DV) is the percentage of Supreme Court cases with liberal
outcomes from 1968-2019. As previously mentioned, in the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et
al., 2020) case outcomes are coded as conservative (1), liberal (2), or unspecified (3) in the
decisionDirection variable, and thus my DV is calculated as the percent of liberal case outcomes
out of all possible cases heard.
%libCourtOutcome = # decisionDirection (2) / # cases
I choose to look at how issue specific presidential campaign rhetoric affects the percent
of liberal outcomes in civil liberties cases and non-civil liberties cases, using a dummy variable

4

Calculated every year using the votes of justices, this is a widely used metric of Supreme Court justice ideology.
Importantly for my project, it accounts for changes in ideology over time to ensure continued accuracy. Segal Cover
Scores do not have the same benefit, instead taking into account only ideological perception at the time of
nomination.
5
There is no data for the year 2020 as the MQ scores for that year are not yet available.

71
(civlib), where a 1 indicates Court outcomes in cases dealing with civil liberties issues and a 0
indicates non-civil liberties issues. This dummy variable is dictated by the issueArea variable in
the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al., 2020), where values 1-5 indicate civil liberties cases
and 6-14 indicate non-civil liberties cases.
%libCourtOutcome (civlib1) = # decisionDirection (2) issueArea (1-5) / # cases issueArea (1-5)
%libCourtOutcome (civlib 0) = # decisionDirection (2) issueArea (6-14) / # cases issueArea (614)
Importantly, I begin my DV data collection 1 year after an election, choosing a 1-year lag
to reflect both the work of other scholars, as well as my own conception of the delayed
responsiveness of the Court. Presidents are elected in November of an election year, while the
Court’s term begins in October, though most Court opinions aren’t handed down until the
following year—with the most consequential decisions often not being released until the final
weeks or days of the Summer end-of-session.6 Therefore, even the earliest (and often least
important) Court outcomes are released roughly one year after a new president is elected, and
follow the new president taking office by nearly that much. By the time most decisions—and
certainly the most consequential decisions—are handed down one year after election, a new
president has been serving for more than a year. For example, in the case of the 1968 election,
Richard Nixon was elected in November of 1968 and I do not begin DV Court outcome data
until the 1969 term. The first decision released in 1969 was on October 27th, though the median

6

Since 1946, only 15% of all decisions have been handed down in a Court term’s first three months (October,
November, and December), and 30% are handed down in June. This is computed using The Supreme Court
Database (Spaeth et al., 2020).
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decision7 wasn’t released until April 6th. Therefore, most decisions in the 1969 term were
released at least one year after President Nixon took office.
Ultimately, this lag time is designed to account for a delay in the effectiveness of the
ideological push of an incoming presidents’ Court-centered rhetoric. 8 My hypothesized
mechanism of influence is comprised of both the enforcement power sitting presidents have, as
well as the rhetorical and directional authority they possess as speakers; therefore, it is necessary
for time to pass between candidates assuming office and any evidence appearing of potentially
reflective or affected voting on the Supreme Court. Mishler and Sheehan (1996) concur with a
short lag time when looking into public opinion’s influence of the Court, finding that "most of
the justices who respond to public opinion appear to do so within one to two years”9 (195). A lag
time of 1 year is reaffirmed both by Clark (2009) when studying the effects of Congress on the
Court, as well as Flemming and Wood (1997). Though there evidently exists a generally agreed
upon lag-time, by testing the liberalism of Court outcomes 1, 2, 3, and 4 years after elections I
hope to add to this ongoing scholarly conversation by contributing my own findings.

Independent Variable of Interest
My independent variable (IV) is the Court-centered campaign rhetoric of winning
presidential candidates from 1968 through 2016. I combine the transcripts of election debate
performances, party nomination acceptance speeches, party platforms, and popular TV

7

The 70th of 141 decisions released in the 1969 term.
There is no data available for the 2020 term, the 4th year following the 2016 election.
9
Mishler and Sheehan (1996) find that aggregate analysis shows a lag time of 5 years, while their own earlier work
in 1993 found a peak lag time effect at 7 years. Though there appears to be support for a longer lag time,
instrumental to my mechanism of influence is that the president plays an integral role in governmental functioning,
and as such, the effect should take place while they serve in office, as well as begin soon after they take office. For
these reasons, a lag time of 1 year is a good place to begin the research for this project, as well as sufficiently well
supported by the scholarship.
8
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advertising into a single corpus for each winning candidate. Analyzing this corpus for references
to the Court and its justices, I validate each search return as either a counted or uncounted
reference to the Court. I then classify each counted instance of Court-centered rhetoric by its
year, issue area, and ideological push; this constitutes my IV, IdeologicalPush. I further organize
Court-centered presidential campaign rhetoric by references to civil liberties and non-civil
liberties issues by employing the same dummy variable used with my DV (civlib).
While there exists no agreed upon metric to quantify or classify presidential campaign
rhetoric, I build off of the work of previous scholars to create my own coding scheme of
dictionary-based text analysis. Rather than study the individual president in question (as I do),
similar studies, such as those done by Link (1995) and Mishler and Sheehan (1996), substitute a
unanimous array of liberal opinions for Democratic Presidents, and conservative opinions for
Republicans, neglecting to assess the specific and particular nature of presidential rhetoric. This
denies many of the fascinating nuances that define presidential rhetoric and priorities. It also
risks limiting the conclusions that may be drawn about how the amount and nature of
presidential campaign rhetoric corelate with Court outcomes. Yates (2002) works to “provide
perhaps a more exacting measure of the policy predilections of presidents” (77) by counting the
number of lines in presidential State of the Union Addresses that fall into any 1 of 4 policy areas.
My project attempts to take the level of precision one step further. I instead classify presidential
campaign rhetoric using a diverse range of campaign messaging (ads, debates, nomination
acceptance speeches, and party platforms), and search this corpus for mentions of the Court, its
justices, and issues before it, using a dictionary of indicative terms. I then sort for civil liberties
and non-civil liberties rhetoric.
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I analyze this corpus of presidential campaign rhetoric using the web application Voyant
to search for terms that concern the Supreme Court. I then independently verify each search
result to confirm its integrity as an instance where the candidate is speaking about the Supreme
Court, its justices, or issues relating to the Court.
The dictionary of Court-centered terms used to search presidential campaign rhetoric is
created by combining key words about the Supreme Court itself, as well as its justices. In
particular, this dictionary is informed by my case studies and the specific language category I
worked to develop there. As displayed in Table 1, I account for any mention of “the Supreme
Court,” “the Court,” or even “the Courts” (as well as many other variants) by searching for the
inclusive term court*. This returns any variation of “court,” including when the word is followed
by other letters, such as “courts,” or even “courthouse.” Similarly, I employ the search terms
justice* and judge* to return any mentions of “Supreme Court justices.” Sometimes referred to
as judges, these two search terms return nearly all references to justices, as well as many false
references to “good judgement” and the “pursuit of justice,” among other things. Additionally, I
search for the last names of every Supreme Court justice to either sit on the bench or be
nominated to the Supreme Court since 1968.10
Lastly, I search for the term roe. The Supreme Court case Roe v. Wade (1973) protected
the right to an abortion in 1973 and continues to today, in part through its legacy, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey (1993). It remains perhaps the most controversial and politically fraught
court case in modern political history. It has also played an important role in election politics,
with support or opposition to its precedential authority having become a litmus test for many
Supreme Court nominees. President Clinton famously made it a test for his appointees while

10

This includes Justice Abe Fortas who was nominated to the position of Chief Justice in 1968—after having served
on the bench since 1965—as he continued serving as an associate justice on the Court until 1969.
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campaigning in 1992 (Stephenson 1999, 1). More recently, President Obama criticized thencandidate Romney in a TV ad in which the Republican responded to a question about Roe’s
potential repeal and the banning by Congress of all abortions by grinning and declaring, “Let me
say, I’d be delighted to sign that bill” (Obama for America, 2012). Additionally, Roe v. Wade
remains one of the Court’s most at risk precedents, with many—including the Court’s most
recently appointed Justice, Justice Barret—openly questioning the ruling’s precedential strength
(Naylor, 2020). As a search term, it is important to note that the inclusion of roe does not skew
my findings, appearing only 9 times in my dataset of presidential rhetoric from 1968-2016.
Additionally, little is lost by not including other well-known and politically contentious Court
cases like Heller11 or Miranda,12 which are each mentioned only 3 times since 1968, all of which
took place in 2016 and 1976, respectively. For these reasons, roe earns a place as part of my
dictionary while other well-known cases do not. A complete list of dictionary search terms can
be found in Table 1.

11
12

Heller v. D.C. (2008)
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
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Table 1: Dictionary of Search Terms
court*

justice*

judge*

Black

Douglas

Warren

Harlan

Brennan

Stewart

White

Fortas

Marshal

Thornberry

Burger

Haynsworth

Carswell

Blackmun

Powell

Rehnquist

Stevens

O'Connor

Rehnquist

Scalia

Bork

Kennedy

Souter

Thomas

Ginsburg

Breyer

Roberts

Miers

Alito

Sotomayor

Kagan

Garland

Gorsuch

Kavanaugh

Barrett

Roe

The comprehensive search tactic I employ raises the possibility for false positives.
Presidents tend to speak in broad terms about justice and being good judges, as well as call on
the memory of John F. Kennedy. The issue is, my dictionary terms return every instance of the
use of “justice” and “judge,” as well as “Kennedy”—which is of course intended to catch
mentions of Justice Anthony Kennedy. To avoid these, and other false positives, I opt for a
conservative research method (least likelihood of over estimating results) by independently
validating each dictionary term. To do so, each return of a dictionary term is independently
validated and either confirmed or not confirmed by reading the surrounding language to
determine the exact meaning of the dictionary term mentioned. Below I detail this validation
process.
The guiding rule that determines whether a dictionary term does indeed reference the
Supreme Court, one of its justices, or an issue before it, and therefore, whether it is counted, —
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beyond good judgment on the part of the reader—is simply whether or not the term is used
explicitly, or implicitly to indicate either of the aforementioned three categories. More simply
put, dictionary terms are counted if the Supreme Court, its justices, or concerned issues are
referenced. A reference to “the court” when speaking about an issue before the Supreme Court or
following a discussion of the appointment of Supreme Court justices, is counted as Courtcentered rhetoric. A general reference to a “court order” that does not come from the Supreme
Court, to a “court of law” that is similarly non-specific, or even “the court of public opinion,” are
all not examined and then non-counted instances of Court-centered rhetoric. President George
W. Bush, for example, used two of these terms during the 2000 election, first during an October
8th debate, stating that “Every action being taken against terrorists requires a court order,” and
soon after during an October 13th debate, noting that “One of the reasons I'm such a strong
believer in legal reform is so that people aren't afraid of producing a product that is necessary for
the health of our citizens and then end up getting sued in a court of law” (italics added). As is
apparent, neither of these instances relate to the Supreme Court, nor risk influencing (or even
making their way to) the Supreme Court justices.
Similarly, mentions of the Federal Court system that don’t either include mention of the
Supreme Court, or call upon an explicit reference to the Supreme Court or its precedents, are not
counted as references to the Court. The Republican Party’s 2016 Platform states that “We call on
the Congress to make the federal courts a model for the rest of the country in protecting the
rights of victims and their families.” Though this statement contains an argument and ideological
direction, it fails to explicitly implicate the Supreme Court. In short, it fails to outwardly
reference the high Court in any meaningful way that might either be reported on in news media
or be interpreted as relating to the work of the Supreme Court by listeners.
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In contrast, when a non-specific mention of the Court is accompanied by a reference to
one of the Supreme Court’s precedents, the term in counted. Ronald Regan spoke at a general
election debate in Kentucky in 1984, saying that “there is a strange dichotomy in this whole
position about our courts ruling that abortion is not the taking of a human life.” Here the
President uses the term “court” in a general fashion but referenced the highly contentious issue
of abortion (though without using the key word roe). This example clearly undermines the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade and is thus verified as a positive return of a dictionary
term despite not naming the Supreme Court or Roe v. Wade outright. In this way, dictionary
terms that are not themselves references to the Supreme Court can be counted when the subject
matter they are a part of is explicitly related to the Court.
Mentions of justice* and judge* quite simply must reference a Supreme Court justice or
judge in order to be counted. Instances either of calling a justice “justice Roberts” or “judge
Roberts,” or referring to a justice mentioned elsewhere by only the term “justice” or “judge” are
counted. References to “justice” as a principle, the “criminal justice system,” “the Justice
Department,” or bringing one “to justice” are not counted. Similarly, the last name of a Supreme
Court justice must refer to that specific justice. For example, “Thomas” must refer to Justice
Clarence Thomas, not his politically active wife nor our nation’s second president. Search
returns for the term Roe are less often ambiguous but must still refer only to the 1973 Supreme
Court case, its legacy, central holding, or precedential value.
Only the terms that follow the above stated guidelines are counted in my data. If two
occurrences of dictionary terms are present in the same instance of text and only one references
or alludes to the Supreme Court, only that one term is counted. For example, in 2000 soon-to-be
President Bush stated in an October 3rd general election that “I just told you the criteria on which
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I'll appoint judges. I have a record of appointing judges in the State of Texas.” While two
instances of the term judge* are present, only one refers to potential Supreme Court nominees,
while the other quite explicitly refers to Texas State judges. This rule also applies to rare cases
where other Supreme Courts are mentioned, such as when in the same debate Bush stated that “A
governor gets to name supreme court judges.” As this does not refer to U.S. Supreme Court
justices, but rather Texas State Supreme Court justices, it is not counted in my data. Relatedly,
when terms appear as one singular coherent phrase, such as “Justice Burger” or “the Warren
Court” they are counted as one single instance of dictionary term use. Lastly, after each term is
used, verified and confirmed, and recorded, I categorize the type (Table 2).

Table 2: Presidential Rhetoric by Type (% of annual total)
Year
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016

Instances
3
5
9
1
9
2
3
1
17
19
10
5
36

%Ads
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
20.0%
0.0%

%Debates
0.0%
0.0%
77.8%
0.0%
44.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
41.2%
36.8%
80.0%
20.0%
58.3%

%Nomination
Acceptance Speech
33.3%
20.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
33.3%
0.0%
0.0%
5.3%
0.0%
0.0%
2.8%

%Party Platform
66.7%
80.0%
22.2%
100.0%
55.6%
100.0%
66.7%
100.0%
58.8%
57.9%
20.0%
60.0%
38.9%

Following this exhaustive confirmation process, I code each Court reference in 2 ways.
First, I code the ideological thrust, or push (IdeologicalPush) of each instance of rhetoric as
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liberal (1), conservative (-1), or neutral (0). Secondly, I categorize the issue or issues concerned
in each of these confirmed Court mentions using the same 14-point issueArea variable coding
used by the Supreme Court Database (Spaeth et al., 2020). I also add the category of
“appointments” rhetoric for when candidates discuss potential nominees. If an instance of
rhetoric address both the issue of appointments and another identifiable issue area, both issue
areas are recorded. If the non-appointments issue area is a civil liberties issue, this instance of
rhetoric is included in civil liberties (and vice versa for non-civil liberties rhetoric). If the
appointments rhetoric avoids all other issue areas, it is not included as either civil liberties
rhetoric or non-civil liberties rhetoric.
The rules that dictate my coding choices for the sumIdeologicalPush variable rely heavily
on judgment, though I employ the Spaeth et al. (2020) decisionDirection variable coding criteria
for less well-defined cases. Most often, the ideological thrust of campaign rhetoric is made clear
from the president’s party identification: a critique of a liberal Court will likely be made by a
conservative presidential candidate, as is true of the opposite. 13
A clear and fairly ordinary example of this can be found in a statement President Bush
made in 2004 (January 6) during a General Election debate that took place in New Hampshire:
“I'll pick judges who strictly interpret the Constitution and not use the bench as a legislative — a
way to legislate. And I will — I will work to keep the Republican Party pro-life” (Bush, 2004).
This message—which was highlighted in searches due to the dictionary term judge*—indicates

13

To quote Mishler and Sheehan’s (1996, 180) succinct description of this variable, “The criteria used to determine
the ideological directionality (i.e., liberalism or conservatism) of decisions are discussed by Spaeth (1992).
Generally, liberal votes are those in favor of civil rights and liberties claimants, economic underdogs, consumers,
unions, and the politically disadvantaged. Conservative decisions are those opposing these interests. Votes in favor
of the government in economic regulation cases are considered liberal.”
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dissatisfaction with the current justices on the Court and offers a remedy by appointing “judges
who strictly interpret the Constitution” and are “pro-life.” As President Bush is a Republican and
speaks of the value of “strictly interpret[ing] the Constitution,” he is expressing a hope to move
the Court to the political right with more conservative justices—as well as his mention of a prolife agenda—and therefore earns a Conservative IdeologicalPush of (-1). Relatedly, a 2008 quote
from Senator Obama made at a General Election debate on October 15th similarly fits our
expectations: “Sen. McCain and I disagreed recently when the Supreme Court made it more
difficult for a woman named Lilly Ledbetter to press her claim for pay discrimination” (Obama,
2008). Here Obama expresses dissatisfaction with a Supreme Court ruling that sided with a large
employer over an individual who was discriminated again, and thus earns a Liberal
IdeologicalPush of (1).
A “neutral (0)” classification is possible for IdeologicalPush, though rare. In 2004,
President Bush said in a debate in Arizona that “What he's asking me is will I have a litmus test
for my judges, and the answer is no, I will not have a litmus test. I will pick judges who will
interpret the Constitution, but I'll have no litmus test” (Bush, 2004). Though this comment
concerns both appointments and Roe v. Wade, Bush doesn’t make a statement either way about
what his values are, nor what his expectations or desires are for justices and nominees. One
might intuit that a lack of a litmus test (which in this case is in regard to Roe v. Wade) indicates
hostility to Roe (which Bush did have, and express elsewhere), but others such as President
Obama similarly hesitated to espouse a litmus test regarding the issue, and as such Bush must be
taken as his word here.14 Conversely, in 1984 President Reagan’s Republican Party Platform
stated that “He pledged to appoint a woman to the United States Supreme Court. His promise

14

Obama stated in an October 15, 2008 debate that “I think it's true that we shouldn't apply a strict litmus test.”
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was not made lightly; and when a vacancy occurred, he quickly filled it with the eminently
qualified Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona.” Though this statement does not express satisfaction
or dissatisfaction for the institution, it does have an ideological bend to it due to O’Connor’s
conservativism, and therefor receives a conservative (-1) IdeologicalPush value. It does not
however relate to either a civil liberties issue nor a non-civil liberties issue, rather concerning
only appointments. These two cases illustrate some of the contours of my ideological and issue
area coding scheme, as well as how statements that concern court nominations can differ.
Finally, another example of a positive (1) IdeologicalPush variable occurs when the
candidate expressly advocates for a liberal position on the Court. In 2008 President Obama noted
in a Debate on October 15th that he “would not provide a litmus test. But I am somebody who
believes that Roe versus Wade was rightly decided. I think that abortion is a very difficult issue
and it is a moral issue and one that I think good people on both sides can disagree on.” Though
perhaps more ambiguous than one might expect from a Democratic President, this message
affirms and even praises the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1973 in Roe v. Wade and, short of
announcing a litmus test, advocates for the ruling’s preservations. Throughout, in cases where
the ideological push of an instance of rhetoric are not clear, I consult the criteria used in the
Supreme Court Database’s (Spaeth et al., 2020) decisionDirection variable and detailed in the
Data section as well as in footnotes 22 and 23.
Lastly, the terminology “instance of rhetoric” refers to a sentence, paragraph, or general
cluster of text that mentions the Supreme Court. A single instance of rhetoric can include a single
dictionary term, or multiple. It can also reference one or more issue areas (as we have seen often
occurs with appointments rhetoric). Figures 1 and 2 details the quantity and kind of instance of
Court rhetoric since 1968.
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Figure 1: Ideology of Court Rhetoric - Civil Liberties
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Figure 2: Ideology of Court Rhetoric - Non-Civil Liberties
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From this IdeologicalPush data I create a sumIdeologicalPush variable that simply sums
the total liberal (1) and conservative (-1) mentions per year. Combined with the previously
mentioned dummy variable for civil liberties issues called civlib, I am able to determine the
overall ideological push that each presidential candidate creates through their Court-centered
rhetoric. This strategy of summing liberal and conservative rhetoric is used by Yates (2002) to
similarly determine the ideological nature of presidential rhetoric in State of the Union addresses.

Control Variables
In order to relate my hypothesized rhetorical influence of Court outcomes to other widely
recognized, and potentially impactful factors in Court decision-making, I include Court ideology,
public mood, and presidential approval as Control Variables in my analysis. Court ideology
(CourtIdeology) is widely considered an important factor in how the Court rules on matters,
particularly when the outcome is measured in terms of ideology (as it is in my project). My
CourtIdeology variable uses the same coding scheme as MQ scores, which runs from -8 to 8,
where a -8 represents the most Liberal justice imaginable, and an 8 indicates the most
conservative justice. Thus, we should expect a negative relationship here—as CourtIdeology
decreases the number of liberal Court outcomes (%libCourtOutcome) increases. Generally, most
median justices hover somewhere between -1 and 1. The Stimson Mood Index (used in my
StimsonMoodIndex variable) measures the mood of Americans by percent liberalism and is based
off of an aggregation of questions asked to respondents annually.15 Here we expect a positive
relationship; as the population becomes more liberal, so might the Court. Finally, I include

15

There are currently no publicly available Stimson Mood Index data for 2019 and 2020. To remedy this, and
continue to be able to run my models, I have repeated the 2018 scores for 2019 and 2020, as public mood generally
changes only gradually.
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presidential approval (PresApproval) to see how variations in presidential popularity affect the
Court, as well as the influence that specific presidents’ rhetoric has on the Court. Importantly, I
code percent approval (PresApproval) as a negative number for Republican presidents and as a
positive number for Democratic presidents: as Republican presidents become more popular, we
expect fewer liberal Court outcomes (%libCourtOutcome) and as Democratic presidents become
more popular, we expect more liberal Court outcomes (%libCourtOutcome). Table 3 illustrates
these expected outcomes.
Table 3: Independent Variables, Expected Outcomes
IV

Description

sumIdeologicalPush
civlib(1)

Sum of all civil liberties Court rhetoric, where
Liberal messaging = (1) and Conservative
messaging = (-1)
Sum of all non-civil liberties Court rhetoric, where
Liberal messaging = (1) and Conservative
messaging = (-1)
Categorical variable that measures time lag in years
1-4 of IV.
Measure of public mood, expressed as percent
liberal.
Measure of median justice ideology (MQ scores),
where (+) values = Conservatism and (-) values =
Liberalism
Presidential approval as a percent, where (+) values
= Democratic presidents and (-) values =
Republican presidents.

sumIdeologicalPush
civlib(0)
time_1-4
StimsonMoodIndex
CourtIdeology
PresApproval

Expected
+
+
N/A
+
+

With these hypothesized relationships in mind, and because my dependent variables (%
liberal outcomes) are continuous, I run 2 OLS Regression models, one for civil liberties
presidential rhetoric and case outcomes, and another for non-civil liberties. To account for the
effect of time, I interact my IV of interest (sumIdeologicalPush) with a categorical variable for
time (time_1-4) that ranges from 1-4. I do this to test the effects of my IV from 1-4 years after
presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric occurs. For example, a time_1-4 variable of 3 tests
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the effect of presidential rhetoric on Court outcomes 3 years after the campaign rhetoric
occurred. I interact these terms because I am interested in the effect of my IV of interest at
different points in time.
Model 1 concerns civil liberties presidential campaign rhetoric and its relationship to civil
liberties Court outcomes, and thus has a civlib variable value of 1. Model 2 deals with non-civil
liberties campaign rhetoric and its relationship to non-civil liberties Court outcomes, using a
civlib variable value of 0. Formally stated:

Model 1 (civlib = 1): %libCourtOutcome = sumIdeologicalPush x time_1-4 + StimsonMood +
CourtIdeology + PresApproval
Model 2 (civlib = 0): %libCourtOutcome = sumIdeologicalPush x time_1-4 + StimsonMood +
CourtIdeology + PresApproval

My final dataset proceeds by year from 1968-2019. For each year there is an IV
(sumIdeologicalPush) that indicates the ideological thrust of Court-centered campaign rhetoric
for each president since Nixon. This variable remains constant throughout the four-year term,
though when interacted with a categorical time variable (time) can indicate changes in
effectiveness over those four years. Every year or row in the dataset also has a DV
(%libCourtOutcome) that measures the percent of Court cases that were liberally decided in the
term that begins in the following year. Every year also has a StimsonMoodIndex variable
measuring the public mood of the following year, a CourtIdeology variable assessing the Court’s
ideological disposition, and a PresApproval variable to indicate the level of presidential approval
one year out.
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Qualitative Analysis Methods
Finally, in an effort to balance my quantitative data, I engage in a qualitative analysis of
the effects of presidential campaign rhetoric on Court outcomes by tracking the aftermath of
specific instances of presidential rhetoric from the campaign trail to the courtroom. I choose to
look at how particularly pointed presidential statements referencing the Court and the cases
before it play out in subsequent case outcomes, selecting 3 instances where presidents have not
only advocated a strong ideological desire, but have named their preferred outcomes (uphold,
overturn, rule on, avoid ruling on). I then assess the effectiveness of this presidential advocacy in
achieving the desired outcome in the following two years of Court decisions within that specified
issue area.
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Chapter 4: Results and Conclusions
Results
Quantitative Results
Tables 4 reports the results of statistical models testing the relationship between
presidential Court-centered civil liberties campaign rhetoric and civil liberties Court outcomes
(model 1), and non-civil liberties presidential rhetoric and non-civil liberties Court outcomes
(model 2). Recall that my IV of interest is sumIdeologicalPush, my control variables are
StimsonMoodIndex, CourtIdeology, PresApproval, and my DV is %libCourtOutcome. In Table
4, the first column displays my IVs, the second column shows the statistical relationship between
the named IV and civil liberties Court outcomes (DV), and the third column shows IV
relationships to non-civil liberties Court outcomes (DV). Since my IV of interest was interacted
with a categorical time variable (time) of either 1, 2, 3, or 4, indicating the number of years after
an election, that IV appears four times. For the regression estimates, the first row indicates the
coefficient while the second row lists the standard error in parentheses. More specifically, the
coefficient describes the relationship between the IV and the DV in terms of slope, where a oneunit increase in the IV leads to an increase in the DV described by that coefficient.
The overall model fit (F-statistic) for Model 1 is 5.46, and the reduction in error (Rsquared) is 0.4704, which means that 47% of variance in the share of civil liberties cases with
liberal outcomes one year after an election is explained by the model. More specifically, my
results indicate that presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric in the area of civil liberties
affects Court outcomes in civil liberties cases in the court term beginning in the year following
election. Table 4 reports a coefficient of 0.394 for my IV of interest (sumIdeologicalPush) at 1
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year (time_1), which is statistically significant at a T-value of 2.31 and a P-value 0.026. Each 1
additional instance of liberal Court-policy signaling by a president on the campaign trail
regarding civil liberties issues is associated with a 0.39% increase in liberal civil liberties
outcomes on the Supreme Court. This result is important, and though based on a small number of
observations (n=51), indicates that uttering just over 2 additional liberally minded statements
regarding the Supreme Court can be correlated to a nearly 1% increase in liberal civil liberties
outcomes in the following year’s Court term. The IV does not have the same relationship to the
DV in years 2, 3, and 4 after an election.
In Model 2 the overall model fit (F-statistic) is 1.04, and the reduction in error (Rsquared) is 0.1449, which means that only 14% of variance in the share of non-civil liberties
cases with liberal outcomes one year after an election is explained by the model.
The other statistically significant IV in my two models is the control variable
CourtIdeology, which reaches statistical significance when dealing with civil liberties issues in
Model 1. The coefficient is -12.603 and the standard error is 2.724, while the T-value is -4.63
and the P-value is 0.000. The coefficient is signed negatively as Martin-Quinn Scores use
negative values for liberal ideologies and positive values for conservative ones. Thus, as the
median justice (and the Court along with them) becomes more conservative (indicated by larger
positive values), the percent of liberal Court outcomes decreases, as expected.
While a coefficient of -12.603 might seem to dwarf my IV of interest’s coefficient of
0.394, it is important to note that while the range of CourtIdeology values in my dataset is -0.264
through 1.094, possible sumIdeologicalPush values stretch from -17 to 26 in my data. This
means that the 1 unit change in CourtIdeology that would be correlated with a 12.603% decrease
in liberal rulings from the Court is extremely unlikely and would require more than a 3 standard
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deviation shift in Court ideology.1 The 1 unit increase in sumIdeologicalPush that would
correlate to a 0.394 increase in Court liberalism is less than 1/7th the IV’s standard deviation of
7.688. Therefore, if both variables where to each increase 1 standard deviation,
sumIdeologicalPush would be associated with a 3.029% increase in Court liberalism, while
CourtIdeology would yield a 4.07% decrease in Court liberalism. This is an important, if
surprising finding. The sum of presidential campaign rhetoric that concerns the Court and deals
in civil liberties issues is almost as strongly correlated 1 year after election with Court outcomes
in civil liberties cases as is the ideology of the median Supreme Court justice, or so my findings
seem to indicate. It might well be going too far to understand this to mean that what a president
says about the Court means as much as who sits on it, but this finding should not be
underestimated.

1

CourtIdeology standard deviation is 0.323.
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Table 4: Regression Estimates for Civil Liberties and Non-Civil Liberties Outcomes
Model 1:
Civil Liberties
0.3939118*
(0.1702617)

Model 2:
Non-Civil Liberties
-0.9863698
(0.6016247)

sumIdeologicalPush at time_2

0.1167355
(0.1674074)

0.6408129
(0.6021339)

sumIdeologicalPush at time_3

0.2108862
(0.1661447)

-0.7800022
(0.5997407)

sumIdeologicalPush at time_4

0.0216079
(0.2429398)

1.792076
(1.543424)

StimsonMoodIndex

0.3795747
(0.2104301)

0.1939101
(0.2316063)

CourtIdeology

-12.60286*
(2.724394)

1.164793
(2.923215)

PresApproval

-0.0098079

0.0018044

(0.0200141)

(0.0197276)

27.9351*
(12.81625)
5.46
0.0002
0.4704
51

33.52571*
(14.02735)
1.04
0.4175
0.1449
51

sumIdeologicalPush at time_1

cons
F-Statistic
Prob>F
R-Squared
n
Significance codes: p<0.01** p<0.05**

Interestingly, when I coded instances of rhetoric where presidents spoke only of
nominations—without articulating an issue-specific ideological message—as part of the civil
liberties count, the IdeologicalPush variable dropped out of statistical significance at time_1 and
became statistically significant at time_2 (Appendix A). This might be because more pointed or
direct rhetoric that targets specific issue areas could have a stronger impact on the Court in the
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short term. Statements by presidential candidates concerning the preferred ideology of their ideal
nominees it seems might affect the justices with more of a lag. Alternatively, statements about
the expectations presidents hold and desires they have for forthcoming judicial nominees might
affect sitting justices less than they do the justices that presidents go on to appoint. Every
president in the years my dataset spans has confirmed at least one justice in their first two years
in office. Though more research is needed to answer the question of why or how the inclusion of
nominations rhetoric delays the influence of presidential campaign rhetoric one more year, one
possibility could be that the statements presidents make about the ideology of their desired
judicial nominees are correlated to Court decisions 2 years after election either by influencing
those nominees, or perhaps more logically, because presidents tend to appoint justices who agree
with their selection bias.
The public mood (StimsonMoodIndex) and presidential approval (PresApproval) were
never statistically significant in my models. This runs counter to some of the research reviewed
in my literature review, but as my research design was created to focus on the influence of my IV
of interest, it is not too concerning for my overall findings. Importantly, the signs of most the
control variable coefficients are as expected in Table 3, indicating at least that they trend in the
correct direction.

Qualitative Results
My qualitative analysis offers moderate support for my statistical results. By assessing
three different instances of presidential campaign rhetoric, and the subsequent Court outcomes in
the issue areas concerned, I find further support for my quantitative findings that presidential
campaign rhetoric is correlated to Supreme Court outcomes. I show that advocacy from Clinton
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in favor of preserving Roe v. Wade, and statements of support from Bush’s Republican Party
Platform for religious freedom are correlated with Court decisions which uphold and advance
these values and ideals. Complicating my results slightly, I also find that despite referencing a
case before the Supreme Court in his Party Platform, President Nixon’s Justice Department was
not able to win a suit brought against California and Nevada to help protect Native American
claims to water rights.
In 1992 Bill Clinton gave a rousing Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Democratic
Party Convention in New York where he announced his unambiguous support for the
constitutional protection for abortion secured by Roe v. Wade (1973). He declared, “I hope the
right to privacy can be protected and we will never again have to discuss this issue on political
platforms. But I am old enough to remember what it was like before Roe v. Wade, and I do not
want to return to the time when we made criminals of women and their doctors” (Clinton
Nomination Acceptance Speech, 1992). Clinton’s unequivocal support for Roe and the right to
an abortion stands out not only for its singular message—that Roe must be upheld, and its
protections made accessible to all—but for its inherent implication of the Court. Though Clinton
does not mention the Supreme Court, by way of naming his preference for preserving one of the
(if not the single) most controversial Supreme Court ruling of the past half-century, Clinton here
made an explicit appeal to the American people and Supreme Court alike regarding one of the
most salient issues of the day.
Over the following two Court terms (1993 and 1994), the Supreme Court ruled 75%
liberally (3 of 4 cases) in the implicated issue area of privacy. The first of these cases, National
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler (1994), saw the Court open the way for the
prosecution of individual anti-abortion activists as part of an organized “enterprise,” ruling that
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the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) does not require an economic
motive to be used in court. The second case, United States Department of Defense et al. Federal
Labor Relations Authority et al. (1994), held that the Privacy Act protects home addresses of
employees from release to unions. While this second case had nothing to do with the right to an
abortion, National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler dealt with an important aspect of
abortion rights, accessibility, making way for more aggressive legal action against antagonistic
anti-abortion activists—and thus more sturdy legal protection for the accessibility of abortion.
Writing for the unanimous majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not mention Roe, nor even the
right to an abortion, and thus his words and the Court decision offer weak evidence of Clinton’s
rhetoric manifesting on the Court, despite passing down a technical ruling that helped ensure
access to abortions.
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) similarly ruled in favor of protecting
women’s access to abortions—and against the rights of anti-abortion activists—but dealt more
centrally with preserving the fundamental right to an abortion. In this case the Court held parts of
Florida’s restrictions on protesting abortion clinics (and their workers and clients) were
constitutional—such as 36-foot no-protesting buffers along the front of clinics, and restrictions
on noise and verbal attacks directed toward workers and patients —while the aspects of the law
that did not interfere with the running of the clinic or the ability of the staff to live in their
homes—such as a buffer on the side and back of clinics, and approaching patients outside—were
ruled unconstitutional. Roe v. Wade is mentioned once in Rehnquist’s majority opinion to
summarize and agree with the Florida Supreme Court’s recognition of a state’s “strong interest in
protecting a woman’s freedom to seek lawful medical or counseling service in connection with
her pregnancy” (512 U.S. 753 1994, 767). Abortion rights are thus recognized as one of
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government’s compelling interests. In his opinion, the Chief Justice used measured language to
describe how “the state also has a strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order…[and]
the free flow of traffic,” as well as the unique status of patients “held ‘captive’ by medical
circumstances” (768). The opinion goes on to dispassionately rule “that the combination of these
governmental interests is quite sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect
them” (768). Roe survived, though not all of the Florida restrictions on anti-abortion protesters
did.
As for Clinton’s rhetorical plea, Rehnquist did uphold Roe’s central finding that the right
to privacy includes the right to an abortion, and even the right to have access to an abortion. The
decision is far from making “criminals of women and their doctors,” as Clinton feared. The New
York Times’ Linda Greenhouse (1994) wrote, “HIGH COURT BACKS LIMITS ON PROTEST
AT ABORTION CLINIC, and that the decision “was greeted with relief by abortion rights
groups and with sharp disappointment by abortion opponents.” In all, two of the first three
privacy rulings following Clinton’s 1992 appeal to protect Roe saw the Court make a good faith
effort to safeguard the right, and access, to an abortion.
The final case—and only one decided conservatively in the two-year line of privacy
rulings—is Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (1995), where the Court ruled that high school
drug testing of athletes does not violate the 4th Amendment. Though not related to abortion
rights, this last case is mentioned (though not by name) in the 1992 Democratic Party Platform:
“The Clinton Administration went to the Supreme Court to support the right of schools to test
athletes for drugs” (Democratic Party Platform, 1992). Here, the government won, though the
ruling was ideologically conservative, as graded by the Supreme Court Database. This is likely
because the ruling was not “pro-child,” which is one of the factors the Database uses to help
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decide liberalism. Again, we see the priorities of presidential campaign rhetoric reflected in (or
at the very least, correlated with) outcomes on the Court. Anecdotally, these four examples
appear to support the finding that at times, pointed, issue-specific presidential rhetoric from the
campaign trail can have an effect on the Court in the short term. Clinton’s campaign rhetoric
previewed two important rulings that helped further protect the accessibility of abortion—though
chose not to focus much on the right in the opinion—one decision that granted the Democratic
party’s stated priority for the right to drug testing, and finally, a pro-privacy union decision.
12 years later, President George W. Bush's Republican party platform advocated for
Conservative outcomes on First Amendment Court issues throughout his bid for re-election,
focusing most on religious liberty. In 2004 the Republican Party Platform stated “We will
continue to work for the return of voluntary school prayer…We strongly support voluntary
student-initiated prayer in school without governmental interference. We strongly disagree with
the Supreme Court's rulings against student-initiated prayer” (Republican National Convention,
2004). The document went on to “condemn judicial activists and their unwarranted and
unconstitutional restrictions on the free exercise of religion in the public square.” Here, The
Republican Party, under the leadership of President Bush, declared its disapproval of past liberal
Court rulings in the area of religious freedom and expression.
In the following two Court terms the justices ruled 20% liberally in the area of the First
Amendment (2 of 10 decisions in the 2005 and 2006 terms), and only 14% liberally in the first
year after the election (1 of 7 in the 2005 term). In the only case dealing directly with religion,
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (2006), the Court ruled that RFRA
(the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) allowed the use of an otherwise prohibited drug (hoasca
or DMT) in the context of religious ceremonies and that the government had failed to justify a
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compelling interest in its restriction of that drug’s use in a religious context. The plaintiff won.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that by passing RFRA, “Congress
recognized that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
intended to interfere with religious exercise," and that the body had legislated "the compelling
interests test" as the means for the courts to "strik[e] sensible balances between religious liberty
and competing prior governmental interests" (546 U.S. 418 2006, 439). This decision fell in line
with Bush’s, and the Republican Platform’s, pro-religious freedom messaging, though
interestingly, the case is counted as a liberal decision by the Supreme Court Database.2 The case
was thus a victory for Bush’s broader religious freedom agenda by solidifying that RFRA
allowed for individual requests for exemptions from generally applicable laws on religious
freedom grounds. This finding also hints at the idea that party platforms do in fact carry some
wait, perhaps only when they repeat a claim, but that their most central messaging can be an
important part of presidential rhetoric.
More specific still, in 1972 President Nixon’s Republican Party Platform advocated a
preference in a specific case coming before the Court. The Platform stated, “We are seeking to
protect Indian water rights in Pyramid Lake by bringing suit in the Supreme Court” (Republican
Party Platform, 1972). The case, United States v. Nevada (1973), was ultimately decided against
the U.S., denying the federal government’s request to file a bill of complaint against California
and Nevada to force the naming of water rights in the Truckee River, which ends in Pyramid
Lake. The Per Curium opinion reads, “There is no controversy between the two states with

2

The reason this case is marked as having been decided liberally is because the individual won the case, not the
government. In the vast majority of cases this leads to a liberal outcome, but as this specific case deals with the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)—and when the individual wins this class of cases, they gain a religious
exception to generally applicable laws—this case is different. In a more nuanced sense, Gonzales v. O Centro has in
reality a politically conservative outcome.
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respect to the Truckee River,” asserting that the Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over a
dispute between the federal government and two states, and that the justices preferred to apply
their original jurisdiction sparingly. Thus, the case was better decided in lower court.
Interestingly though, the case is described by The Supreme Court Database as having been
decided conservatively, though the decision ran against the Nixon administration’s campaign
wishes. Marked as a non-civil liberties case (issueArea 9, Judicial Power), the disconnect
between presidential rhetoric and the Court outcome here reinforces my statistical findings that
presidential campaign rhetoric is less effective in non-civil liberties issues. While the previous
two instances of pointed presidential campaign rhetoric were correlated to continuity in
subsequent Court decisions, in this non-civil liberties case the Court did not rule with the
president’s preference.

Conclusion
My findings indicate that presidential campaign rhetoric can influence the Supreme Court
under certain circumstances. More specifically, my regression analysis shows a statistically
significant relationship between presidential Court-centered campaign rhetoric regarding civil
liberties issues and the liberalism of Court outcomes in civil liberties cases during the Court term
beginning one year after an election; my anecdotal evidence supports the claim that presidential
Court-centered campaign rhetoric can be correlated with Supreme Court decisions and opinions,
though is not always.
This conclusion carries important implications for presidents as well as the Court. When
candidates ridicule or praise the Court to cheers and applause on the debate stage or in speeches,
this rhetoric can have an effect beyond just rallying the support of voters. The justices—just like
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presidents and their cheering voters—react to pointed reviews and stinging rebukes. Whether this
information might increase presidential statements about the Court, or decrease them, I do not
know.
The past two presidential elections have been at least in part consumed with talk of the
Supreme Court, as a justice has passed in the midst of both elections. In 2016 Justice Scalia died
suddenly early in the Republican Primary. With the help of Mitch McConnell stonewalling
President Obama’s nominee Merrick Garland in the Senate, the topic of who would appoint
Scalia’s replacement played a major role throughout the remaining 8 months of the election.
Speaking soon after, Trump gleefully teased “Here’s the story, If you really like Donald Trump,
that’s great. But if you don’t you have to vote for me anyway. You know why? Supreme Court
judges, Supreme Court judges. Have no choice. Sorry, sorry, sorry” (Hulse 2019, 149). In 2020,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away less than two months before election day. President Trump’s
nominee to replace her, Amy Coney Barret, was announced 11 days after and confirmed a month
later, reigniting anger among many over Garland’s unfair treatment and leading to strengthen
calls for Court reform from the Left. In many ways, the Supreme Court has been one of the
central dramas of the past two presidential elections.
The fact that presidents campaign in part on their hopes and dreams for the Supreme
Court makes sense. Americans care about the Court, and care even more deeply about the issues
it rules on. Some of the most impassioned political advocacy and citizen engagement on both
sides of the aisle center around Supreme Court decisions and their legacies. Issues like gun
rights, abortion, campaign finance, affirmative action, and religious liberty are all issues the
Supreme Court has had a principal role in defining in American law and society. When these
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issues do arise, it is only natural for politicians to speak up, particularly if they are seeking the
oval office.
In 2010, President Obama, though already in office, did just that. Speaking at the annual
State of the Union Address following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United Obama said,
“Last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open the floodgates to special
interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.” Sitting only
feet in front of the President and flanked by his fellow justices all in black robes, Justice Alito
mouthed “not true” (Kady, 2010). This kind of direct confrontation between the president and the
Court happens only very rarely in American politics. Most often, jabs and slander—and
occasional praise—are mediated through the media, and though this might dull the sting public,
personal humiliation brings, it likely does not do away with the power of critiques altogether.
In another high-profile example of a judicial response to presidential insult, Chief Justice
Roberts replied to a complaint by President Trump that an “Obama judge” had ruled against him
by declaring that “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges…we have an extraordinary
group of dedicated judges” (Liptak, 2018). What these few but not-insignificant examples show
is that Supreme Court justices care about what is said of them, particularly when it comes from
the President. What my findings in this paper show is that this might well play into not only what
justices say and how they feel about the president and their own branch of government, but how
they rule as well.
My results cast a curious light on the impartiality of the Supreme Court. In fact, much of
the study of judicial politics does; some might argue, or hope, that the term itself is an oxymoron.
Whether it is research showing the unrivaled success of the Solicitor General before the Court,
data displaying broad ideological swings in jurisprudence, evidence of strategic maneuvering
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among the justices, or much of the public opinion and separation of powers research I detail
early in my literature review, this field of study paints a picture of a Court that runs counter to
the founder’s design. At the same time, with the Court’s current membership locked in a 6-3
conservative bent, some might find hope in the notion that the popular will that elected President
Biden might be reflected in some way on the Court. This research also makes the Court more
understandable, if predictable, and makes the justices more human. The finding that presidential
campaign rhetoric influences the way the Court rules, or at least correlates to it, challenges part
of the foundation of our separation of powers system and calls into question the insulated design
of the Supreme Court, while at the same time offering solace to those who are uneasy with the
idea that nine unelected judges decide the fate of our laws.
This project adds to the ongoing scholarly conversation about what influences and
constrains the Supreme Court. In particular, it bolsters the claim made by Yates (2002) that
presidential rhetoric can influence the Court, and builds upon it by extending the understood time
period of possible influence to statements made on the campaign trail, even before the president
takes office. It also helps insert presidential rhetoric as a factor in the widely recognized and
debated separation of powers constraints on the Court. Finally, my project adds to the ongoing
academic conversation around lag times, that is, how long it takes the Court to react to
constraints, by finding a one-year lag for presidential campaign rhetoric’s influence on Court
outcomes.
There are three straightforward things that could be improved upon and expanded on in
this study. First, I could look at a wider array of campaign rhetoric, such as campaign statements,
interviews, and press releases, as well as in more modern campaigns, internet content such as
tweets. To look not just at Court-centered rhetoric, but rather categorize the tenor of all campaign
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speech—as Yates (2002) did with State of the Union Addresses—would only strengthen my
data. Another idea would be to test the relationship between campaign messaging and Court
outcomes by the more precise category of issue area, not just civil liberties or non-civil liberties
rhetoric.
This research also begs many more questions than it answers, such as, which instances or
types of rhetoric are most influential? Which justices are most affected: median justices, newly
appointed justices? Are Republicans or Democrats more likely to try to influence the Court?
Relatedly, are Democrats or Republicans more successful? Has the modern era of campaigning
for longer amounts of time and reaching more people via the internet increased the effectiveness
of presidents’ rhetorical power? Has it made presidential candidates more able to influence the
Court? Ultimately, this project only begins to answer the question of how presidential campaign
rhetoric influences the Supreme Court, but in doing so, provides a principal finding that in the
realm of civil liberties, presential Court-centered campaign rhetoric influences the liberalism of
Court outcomes.
When Chief Justice Rehnquist (1986) noted that “judges go home at night and read the
newspapers or watch…television; they talk to their family and friends about current events” he
was presumably not disputing the founders’ constitutional or judicial design, nor challenging
Alexander Hamilton in particular, who nearly 200 years earlier had observed that the “general
liberty of the people” was only protected so long as “the judiciary remains truly distinct from
both the legislature and the executive” (Federalist 78, 464). Perhaps both of these things can be
true though, that the justices of the highest court in America are subject to outside influence
(presidential campaign rhetoric now one of these factors), and yet, the rulings that they hand
down are worthy, and the institutional integrity of the Court remains steadfast.
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Appendix A:
Table 5: Regression Estimates for Civil Liberties and Non-Civil Liberties Outcomes
Model 1:
Civil Liberties
0.2336698
(0.1951468)

Model 2:
Non-Civil Liberties
1.57922*
(0.6837696)

sumIdeologicalPush at time_2

0.4595935*
(0.2021805)

-0.3988236
(0.7109724)

sumIdeologicalPush at time_3

0.0761766
(0.2059556)

0.7623424
(0.7327692)

sumIdeologicalPush at time_4

0.1588085
(0.2626357)

2.174456
(1.915906)

StimsonMoodIndex

0.7000925*
(0.2420045)

0.2762319
(0.2695699)

CourtIdeology

-14.59941*
(2.869721)

0.0992119
(3.064071)

PresApproval

-.0165939
(-0.0233762)

-0.0070425
(0.0202064)

10.27663
(14.37402)
5.20
0.0002
0.4584
51

29.5765
(15.78149)
1.20
0.3246
0.1632
51

sumIdeologicalPush at time_1

cons
F-Statistic
Prob>F
R-Squared
n
Significance codes: p<0.01** p<0.05**
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